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Respondeat Superior In The Light
Of Comparative Law
ROBERT NEUNER*
The law, in adjusting conflicts of interests, must necessarily
make use of concepts. These are the tools with which it works in
its endeavor to produce desired social results. Like a craftsman,
the lawyer must be concerned about the efficiency of his tech-
nique; he must be on the alert to determine whether the concepts
he uses are the most effective for his purpose. One available test
is to assemble the tools familiar to him and compare them with
those employed in other legal systems. Such a comparative study
does not, of course, proceed upon the assumption that a foreign
system is better than our own, for we can profit from its mistakes
as well as its virtues.
Not all fields of law lend themselves equally well to a com-
parative investigation of this kind. Such a study can be under-
taken with profit only if at least three basic conditions are pres-
ent. First, there must exist a similarity in the economic and social
situations prevailing in the countries whose legal systems are
being compared. Second, there must be a fundamental agreement
in general policy on the questions in issue. Third, there must
exist a difference in the legal techniques employed in enforcing
a common policy.
The purpose of the present study is to place side by side
the several competing techniques employed by the United States,
England, France, Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia in deal-
ing with the liability of a master for the torts of his servants.
In this manner we shall seek to ascertain which set of techniques
more properly fulfills the function assigned to it. This subject
generally satisfies the above mentioned conditions, but there are
exceptions. As to certain problems, for example those relating to
double employment, the techniques employed by the various sys-
tems are so similar that the comparison cannot be useful. Hence,
* Instructor in Law, Yale University.
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we are compelled to limit our inquiry to some of the more basic
questions which arise.
Another reason sometimes makes it advisable either to omit
a comparative consideration of a legal problem or to treat it only
lightly in passing. A judgment upon the practicability of a par-
ticular piece of legal technique can be pronounced only after the
rule or concept has been applied persistently by the courts in
many and varied situations. It often happens that a problem
forms the subject of repeated litigation in one particular juris-
diction, while in another jurisdiction the same problem appears
to be unknown. If this difference cannot be explained by refer-
ence to the nature of the rules applied, the comparative method
must be abandoned, for a rule that is relatively untested in liti-
gation cannot be compared satisfactorily with another rule whose
practicability is known.
I. LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OR ABSOLuTE RESPONSIBILITY
Both the common law and the French law are in accord on
the principle that the liability of an employer for the wrongful
acts of his employees is in no way dependent on any fault of the
employer.' In marked contrast to this position German law has
imposed a more limited liability upon the employer by connect-
ing his liability with his personal fault; the master is liable only
when he has engaged a servant whom he knew or should have
known was unfit, or when he did not properly supervise the
servant's activities.
On closer analysis, however, the distinction is not as sharp
as was indicated above. There are a few indications in the com-
mon law which suggest that the basis of the employer's liability
is his fault. Persons employed to perform service for others are
commonly classified at common law either as servants or as in-
dependent contractors. The distinction between these two classes
of persons is drawn by determining whether or not the employer
is in a position to control the conduct of the employee. This con-
trol test suggests perhaps that personal fault on the part of the
employer is the basis of vicarious liability; for if it is assumed
to be true that only a person who is under the employer's control
is a servant, then it may be inferred that the employer is respon-
sible for negligent use of his right of control. Although this in-
1. Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Classifica-
tion (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 325; Steffen, Independent Contractor and the
Good Life (1935) 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 501, 507.
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ference has never been drawn by the courts, nevertheless the
very existence of the control test is a factor which suggests con-
siderations of negligence. When the element of control is lacking
and the employee is for that reason designated an independent
contractor, the notion of fault becomes even more conspicuous.
This is illustrated by the well known principle that an employer
is liable for the torts of an independent contractor entrusted with
a dangerous enterprise if the employer has failed to take "the
necessary precautionary measures." Under these circumstances
it is not superfluous to compare the concepts and techniques of
the two systems; for their basic assumptions, although divergent
in abstract outline, have probably much in common. The com-
parison with the German system will show how the principle of
fault, of which there are only traces in the common law, works if
extended its full measure.2
In order properly to understand the large volume of German
cases, it is well to begin by examining the basic rules as they are
set out in the code. The code distinguishes three situations. First,
there is the situation involving a contractual relationship be-
tween the employer and the injured third party. This is dealt
with by Section 278. The master is liable if one of his servants
violates a duty arising from the contract, even though he, the
master, is guilty of no personal fault. Second, there are the cases
where a tort was committed by the representative of a juristic
person (corporate body) who, unlike other agents and servants,
derives his power from the articles of the constitution itself.
Under Section 31 of the code the corporate body or juristic person
is unconditionally liable 'for the torts of its constitutional repre-
sentatives. Third, there remain all the other instances where the
servant commits a wrongful act, and which are covered by Sec-
tion 831. Here the master against whom suit is brought may
assert as an affirmative defense that he exercised care in the
selection of the servant and, if supervision was necessary, that he
reasonably performed his duty of supervision. In all the cases
that fall under this third classification the master has the affirma-
tive burden of proving the facts that constitute his defense. There
are few cases where the master does not undertake this proof,
and most disputes consequently turn on the issue of his negli-
2. A general discussion of this problem took place in the meetings of the
seventeenth and eighteenth "Deutschen Juristentag," 1884 and 1886. See, in
addition, Heinsheimer, Die Haftung des Schuldners filr seine Erfiillungsgehil-
fen (Austria, 1914) 40 Griinhuts Zeitschrift 121. The origin of the German sys-
tem is attributed to Rudolf Von Jhering.
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gence. Therefore, notwithstanding some theoretical dispute as to
the basis of employer's liability,3 the initial statement that the
German law bases the employer's liability upon his fault is fully
justified with the exceptions mentioned.
What structure did the Supreme Court erect upon these
foundations? In the first place there is a noticeable tendency to
expand the application of Section 278, which makes the employer
unconditionally liable if a contractual relationship exists. This,
in turn, results in a corresponding restriction of the area em-
braced by Section 831, which would permit the employer to prove
that he exercised care in the selection and supervision of his
employee. The expansion of Section 278 was achieved by adopting
the position that the contract with the injured persons engenders
collateral duties in addition to the obligation expressly under-
taken by the promisor-an idea which had been developed by
the Romans in their bonae-fidei contracts.4 Collateral duties of
this sort have been found in numerous contractual situations.
For example, the courts have imposed a duty to protect the lessee
or the customer of a restaurant against dangers. They have like-
wise held that there is a duty to instruct the buyer of an article
as to its safe and proper use, and that a bank must give correct
advice on investments when the main duty is to keep bonds and
shares.
The application of this idea in the interpretation of contracts
has produced various desirable consequences. The most con-
spicuous result is the severe restriction which is effected in the
operation of Section 831. As soon as the plaintiff is able to show
that a contractual duty has been violated, the defendant can no
longer set up the defense that the servant who caused the breach
was carefully selected and supervised. This is apparently the
precise result which the Supreme Court wished to reach. 5
Section 31 of the code, providing that the corporate body is
3. The legal literature reveals a division of opinion as to the correct
interpretation. See Deetz, Der Haftungsgrund bei den unerlaubten Hand-
lungen des BGB. insbesondere bei § 831 (Germany, 1920) 64 Gruchots Beitrdge
167; Jovy, Der Begriff der Bestellung im § 831 des Biirgerlichen Genetzbuchs
(Germany, 1912) 37 Archiv fUr bUrgerliches Recht 123.
4. The leading case is Reichsgericht, Dec. 1911, RGZ. 78, 239. In accord
with this interpretation: Riezler, Haftung filr Schddigung durch Sachen nach
franzbsischem und englischem Recht (Germany, 1931) 5 Rabels Zeitschrift
570; Weigert, Ausservert ragliche Haftung von Grossbetrichen fUr Anges-
tellte (1925) 1.
5. Over the protest of some writers, see Schneider, Der Begriff des Er-
fiillungsgehilfen nach § 278 BGB. (Germany, 1908) 53 Jherings Jahrbiicher 6
et seq.
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unconditionally liable only for the wrongful acts of its "constitu-
tional representatives," did not easily lend itself to expansion.
The Supreme Court applied itself laboriously to the task of find-
ing a definition of the "constitutional representative," but it did
not arrive at any clear and satisfactory solution. The result of a
long judicial development is that only a few of the persons who
act on behalf of a corporate body are regarded as members of
this restricted group of representatives. In this respect the field
of liability was not expanded. As to the question under what
conditions the agent's tort makes the corporate body liable, the
Supreme Court has applied the general doctrine, to be discussed
below, that a connection with the employment is sufficient. The
phenomenon which is of interest here is the creation of a rule
that a corporate body acts wrongfully if it entrusts to an ordinary
agent certain tasks (which ones does not become clear) that prop-
erly should be entrusted only to a constitutional representative.'
So it is said that a municipality is not allowed to transfer the care
for the safety of its highways entirely to an ordinary agent, how-
ever capable he might be. A certain amount'of supervision must
be exercised by a constitutional representative. It appears harsh
to criticise an organization for entrusting a given task to an ordi-
nary agent instead of to a constitutional representative, if both
are equally capable. Consequently, it would seem that what has
been regarded as wrong is the possibility of evading responsi-
bility by this kind of organization; for had the corporate body
been allowed to entrust an ordinary agent with the specific task,
it could have escaped liability by proving care in selection and
supervision under Section 831. The application of this section
itself must have been felt as leading to an unjust result.
The above process of restricting the sphere within which
Section 831 should be applied was accompanied by a gradual
modification of the meaning of this section itself. The tendency
here also has been toward the imposition of stricter liability. The
Supreme Court has imposed a standard of care in the selection
of servants which has been increasingly higher and higher. If
all employers were to comply with these requirements as judici-
ally defined, a servant who once committed a tort would find it
6. Reichsgericht, March 24, 1904, JW. (1904) 232; Feb. 8, 1904, Gruch.
Beitrage 48 (1904) 601; Nov. 28, 1913, Warn. (1914) 50; April 1, 1931, JW.
(1932) 2076; Oct. 10, 1932, JW. (1932) 3702; Dec. 19, 1935, JW. (1936) 915;
March 14, 1937, JW. (1939) 1683; March 9, 1938, RGZ. 157, 228. The same
principle was applied to a single person in Reichsgericht, April 29, 1926, RGZ.
113, 293.
19411
.LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
extremely difficult to secure other employment." An unexpected
consequence of this continual raising of the standard of care was
the unfair advantage which was gained by large enterprises over
small employers. The larger businesses, through their efficient
bureaus of appointment or personnel, are capable of substantiat-
ing the defense of a careful selection with facts, while the little
employer, who acts in a more haphazard way, is rarely in a posi-
tion to do this. The resulting preference of the large employers
has been criticized by legal writers,8 and even by the Supreme
Court.9 In order to reestablish some equality of treatment, the
court developed several propositions, the most important of
which is the principle that enterprises are liable for defects of
organization. ° It is interesting to notice that the cases here seem
to deal almost exclusively with corporations. Under this rule the
victim of an employee's tort may recover damages from the cor-
porate employer if he can show that the latter was not so organ-
ized as to assure a steady supervision and control of his em-
ployees and to prevent potentially dangerous situations.
This rule is only a single instance of a broader, newly-created
principle which, though framed to cover all employers, again
affects large enterprises most. Section 831 makes the employer
liable for negligent supervision only where he must superintend
the work of his employees but does not itself impose any duty of
supervision under its commonly accepted interpretation. Here
too the Supreme Court has spoken; it has held that no one em-
ploying servants can escape the duty of providing at least a cer-
tain amount of supervision.1' But it remains not clear how far
this supervision must go. This kind of liability is liability for the
employer's own negligence, based on Section 823, not liability for
7. Brodmann, Die Haftung des Schuldners nach § 278 BGB., insbesondere
die Haftung des Versicherungsnehmers (Germany, 1911) 58 Jherings Jahr-
bucher 187, 193.
8. Jovy, supra note 3, at 123; Mataja, Das Recht des Schadensrsatzes
(Leipzig, 1888) 43; Ruth, Archiv fur civilistische Praxis (1926) 126, 354; Wel-
gert, op. cit. supra note 4, at 8; Wilburg, Haftung fur Gehilfen (Austria,
1930) 48 Zentralblatt fiur die jurlstlsche Praxis 744.
9. Reichsgericht, Dec. 19, 1935, JW. (1936) 915.
10. Reichsgericht, June 2, 1913, Warn. (1913) 430; April 20, 1914, JW.
(1914) 759; March 3, 1922, RGZ. 104, 141; Feb. 25, 1931, JW. (1931) 2236; June
6, 1935, S.A. 90, 165; Jan. 12, 1938, JW. (1938) 1651.
11. Innumerable decisions predicate this rule, e.g., Reichsgericht, Sept.
23, 1909, JW. (1909) 659; Jan. 20, 1912, Warn. (1912) 177; May 31, 1912, JW.
(1912) 864; Dec. 9, 1929, JW. (1930) 2927; Jan. 16, 1930, JW. (1930) 3213; Nov.
23, 1931, JW. (1932) 794; Jan. 12, 1933, JW. (1933) 830. The duty of supervision
is sometimes but not always deduced from the dangerous nature of the work
entrusted. The same result can be and is reached by assuming non-delegable
duties.
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the servant's torts as in the cases of Section 831. From this legal
construction follow important differences in pleading and proof,
which we may leave aside here. 12
Halfway between the liability for the servant's torts under
Section 831 and the just mentioned liability for the master's
negligence in supervision is the formula often repeated by the
Supreme Court that only a carefully supervised servant is a
carefully selected one.13
Several conclusions can be drawn from the German experi-
ence. In the first place, a court, when faced with the facts of a
concrete case, usually looks with disfavor upon the defense that
the employer was not guilty of negligence or other personal fault.
Only this can satisfactorily explain the restrictions in both scope
and content which Section 831 of the German Civil Code under-
went in practice. A reading of the many hundreds of German
decisions that deal with the master's liability leads to the further
conclusion that a legal rule which makes the master's liability
depend upon his own negligence introduces an element of un-
reality and uncertainty into the law beyond all tolerable limits.
It is unrealistic to require a degree of care in selection and con-
trol which as a practical matter cannot be exercised. The servant
often has a technical knowledge which the master does not
possess; an effective supervision would involve an intolerable
expense, and finally changes in the social position of the eco-
nomically dependent classes make impossible many forms of
interference which formerly may have been practical.
If the degree of care in supervision exacted by the courts is
in fact illusory, still less can there be any certainty in the appli-
cation of such an illusory concept. How can the courts work out
standards of care in selection and supervision which will furnish
employers a dependable guide for future conduct? The German
Supreme Court has not been able to do it. The obvious conclu-
12. The Reichsgericht could have avoided much of its circuitous reason-
ing if it had required care in the selection of the wrong-doing servant [see
Deetz, supra note 3, at 186; Enneccerus-Lehmann, Lehrbuch des biirgerlichen
Rechts (11 ed. 1930) 758; Greiff, Planck's Commentaries, § 831, n. 2a; Weigert,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 28], but it declares that the master is excused if he
has established that he exercised care In the selection of the highest em-
ployee. Oct. 13, 1904, RGZ. 59, 203; Feb. 8, 1906, JW. (1906) 196; March 30,
1908, Warn. (1908) 369; April 20, 1914, JW. (1914) 759.
13. Reichsgericht, Dec. 4, 1924, JW. (1930) 2927; Dec. 11, 1929, Warn.
(1930) 60; Jan. 16, 1930, JW. (1930) 3213.
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sion is that a system of law which bases the employer's liability
upon his own negligence does not recommend itself."
II. THE INFLUENCE OF EXISTING CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
The prevailing opinion among judges and legal writers in
the common law countries appears to be that the master's lia-
bility must be judged by the ordinary rules of respondeat supe-
rior even if the harmful act of the servant results in a violation
of a contractual duty owed by the master to the injured person.
In contrast to this position we have observed that the German
Civil Code draws a distinction in this respect. Section 278 ex-
pressly states that the master is responsible for the faults of
persons whom he employs in the performance of his contract
and gives him no possibility of exculpation as in other tort cases
proper. In France, too, some of the legal writers have emphasized
the necessity for such a distinction.15 The question whether this
distinction has its root in some more fundamental principle of
contract law is not merely an academic one. An indiscriminate
application of the ordinary rules of respondeat superior in con-
tract cases will of necessity divert the judges' attention from
other points which, in the making of a fair adjustment of the
conflicting interests, should be taken into consideration.
The following pages will be devoted to showing that with
respect to the doctrine of respondeat superior a different treat-
ment of contract cases and tort cases is not only desirable but is
unavoidable, and that such difference in treatment is actually
practiced everywhere, including the common law jurisdictions.
Very often we find the assertion that with respect to con-
tractual relations the master is liable not only for the wrongs
of the servant but also for those of independent contractors
whom he has employed.' Such a statement, however, is mislead-
14. Accord: Seavey, Harvard Legal Essays (1934) 449. The master is, of
course, liable if he is guilty of negligence in selection and supervision. See
Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916) 26 Yale L. J, 105.
15. Becqud, De la Responsabilit6 du fait d'autrui en Mati6re Contrac-
tuelle (France, 1914) 13 Revue Trimestrielle 252; 1 H. Mazeaud et L. Mazeaud,
Trait6 Theorique et Pratique de la Responsabilit6 Civile (3 ed. 1938) 964, no
965; 1 Savatier, Trait6 de la Responsibilit6 Civile (1939) 205, no 159. But see
Esmein, Le Fondement de la Responsabilit6 contractuelle (France, 1933) 32
Revue Trimestrielle 627 et seq.
16. Maryland Dredging & Constructing Co. v. Maryland, 262 Fed. 14
(C.C.A. 4th, 1919); Atlanta & F. R.R. v. Kimberly, 87 Ga. 161, 166, 13 S.E. 277,
278 (1891); Radel v. Borchers, 147 Ky. 506, 508, 145 S.W. 155, 156 (1912);
Schutte v. United Electric Co. of N. J., 68 N.J. Law 435, 437, 53 AtI. 204, 205
(1902). A fortlori the employer is liable if the "independent contractor" was
held out as a servant. Augusta Friedman's Shop, Inc. v. Yeates, 216 Ala.
[Vol. IV
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ing. It suggests that the employer who is under a contractual
obligation is always responsible for harmful conduct of his serv-
ants and independent contractors, and further, that he is respon-
sible for them only. Neither of these extremes actually prevails
in practice. The real question is broader, and can be stated as
follows: If one has promised a certain performance, is he respon-
sible in damages when his default was caused by the act or
omission of another person, or is he excused? The interference
of certain persons with the promised performance will excuse the
promisor, while that of others will not. For example, a depart-
ment store is not excused if a burglar steals the goods out of
the delivery truck; on the other hand, the same store may be
excused if an enemy airplane has wrecked the ship in which
the goods were being transported. The problem is where to
draw the line between those persons for whose interference
the promisor is liable and others (called third persons by the
French) 17 for whose conduct he should not be held responsible.
On this point generalizations are impossible; the question can be
answered only by construing each contract."9 Only for particular
types of agreements can rules of interpretation be developed. In
fact, such rules are constantly applied, even though they are not
always recognized as such.19
434, 113 So. 299 (1927); Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167 N.Y. 244, 60 N.E. 597
(1901); Cour d'appel de Poitiers, Dec. 12, 1904, Sirey 1906.2.157; Reichsgericht,
July 3, 1936, J.W. (1936) 3111.
17. Ferrara, Responsabilith Contrattuale per Fatto Altrui (Italy, 1903) 70
Archivio giuridico 510; Soarec, La Responsabilit6 Contracturelle pour Autrui
(1932) 22, 110. It is interesting to notice that 6 Williston, Treatise on the Law
of Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) 5421, § 1936, uses the same term to convey the
same idea.
18. The German Supreme Court, probably for the reason stated in the
text at page 4 is very much inclined to regard third persons as "Erfililungs-
gehilfen" for whom the promisor is liable. Reichsgericht, Dec. 21, 1920, RGZ.
101, 152; Dec. 9, 1921, RGZ. 103, 180; Feb. 3, 1922, RGZ. 39, 104; June 5, 1922,
RGZ. 32, 105; Sept. 21, 1923, RGZ. 108, 221. But cf. Jan. 4, 1921, RGZ. 101, 157
and Jan. 9, 1908, Warn. (1908) 131 (the railroad is not responsible for the tort
of an official of the mail). See further Heck, Grundriss des Schuldrechts
(Tilbingen, 1929) 84; Leonhard, 17th Deutscher Juristentag, 340.
19. The lessee of a boat may be responsible for the tug master's fault:
Smith v. Bouker, 49 Fed. 954 (C.C.A. 2d, 1891); a railroad for the fault of
another railroad whose tracks it is using under a license: Brady v. Chicago &
G. W. Ry., 114 Fed. 100 (C.C.A. 8th, 1902). Interesting situations are the cases
where a bank or a forwarding firm was entrusted to present an instrument,
to take over merchandise, to forward merchandise or money and uses another
firm. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, Oct. 21, 1924, Vazny 4283;
June 8, 1927, Vazny 7129. A fuel dealer who had promised to deliver coal at a
residence Is responsible for damage done to the house by the carrier whom
he had charged with the delivery. Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, March
12, 1919, Vazny 90. A promisor who had undertaken to dye cloth was held
liable for the theft of an employee of a subcontractor in Oberster Gerichtshof
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. IV
The rules with respect to warranties of quality in sales con-
tracts are in fact rules which impose responsibility for the acts
of other persons. Generally, in determining the liability of the
seller for defects, it is not relevant whether the defect was
caused by the seller himself, by one of his employees, or by some
third person from whom he acquired the goods.
A reasonable interpretation of other types of contracts makes
it necessary to expand still further the orbit of persons for whose
actions the obligor under a contract may be held liable. The
courts of the civil law countries have not hesitated to hold a les-
see or bailee responsible for damages caused to the premises by
family members and even guests.2 0 On the other hand, there are
Wien, Nov. 19, 1919, SZ. 7, 221. In the early years of the code the legal litera-
ture tried to limit the promisor's liability to acts of servants in the proper
sense of the word. See, e.g., Brodmann, supra note 7, at 190, 226, 232.
20. Ch. req., Jan. 24, 1883, Dalloz 1883.1.153; Cour de Paris, May 20, 1925,
Dalloz 1925.1.503 (servants); Ch. civ., Dec. 13, 1927, Dalloz 1928.1.94 (mistress
of the lessee); Reichsgertcht, Jan. 2, 1923, RGZ. 106, 133 (movers of the
lessee). Contra: Bogle v. Weber, 189 Ill. App. 184 (1914); Supreme Court of
Czechoslovakia, April 23, 1924, Vazny 3753; Supreme Court of Austria, Jan. 31,
1899, GlUnF. 492; Nov. 10, 1920, SZ. 2, 319.
And conversely the lessor was held liable to the lessee for harm caused
by a plumber working in the house: Reichsgericht, June 3, 1921, RGZ. 102,
231. Oberster Gerichtshof Wien, Sept. 25, 1934 (Austria, 1935) 53 Zentralblatt
fiur die jurtstische Praxis 59. Contra: Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 586
(1873) (mason work); Ch. req., June 17, 1890, Sirey 1890.1.321; Ch. civ., July
20, 1932, Dalloz 1932.1.507 (harm caused by another lessee). Cf. Comments
(1940) 102 Deutsche Justiz 1071 and (1941) 11 Deutsches Recht 178 upon the
decision Kammergericht Oct. 2, 1940.
It is interesting to compare these decisions with the common law cases
dealing with the problem of whether or not a bailee is liable for conversions,
destructions and other harms caused by his servants. There is a conflict of
opinion here. See, on the one side, Merchants Nat. Bank v. Carhart, 95 Ga.
394, 22 S.E. 628 (1895); Renfroe v. Fouche, 26 Ga. App. 340, 106 S.E. 303 (1921);
Rhodes v. Warsawsky, 242 Ill. App. 101 (1926); Forster v. Essex Bank, 17
Mass. 479 (1821); Holmes v. First National Bank, 101 N.J. Law 401, 128 Atl.
150 (1925); Weissburg v. People's State Bank of New Kensington, 284 Pa. 260,
131 Atl. 181 (1925); Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Pacific Transfer Co., 120
Wash. 665, 208 Pac. 55, 26 A.L.R. 217 (1922); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Schreiber, 150 Wis. 42, 135 N.W. 507 (1912); Finucane v. Small, 1 Espinasse
315 (1795); Giblin v. McMullen, 5 Moore (N.S.) 434, 16 Eng. Reprint 578 (P.C.
1868); Sanderson v. Collins [1904] L.R. 1 K.B. 628. With the above cases com-
pare the opposing view adopted in Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604, 11 S.Ct.
162, 34 L.Ed. 788 (1891); Maynard v. James, 109 Conn. 365, 146 Atl. 614 (1929);
Evans v. Williams, 232 Ill. App. 439 (1924); Miller v. Viola State Bank, 121
Kan. 193, 246 Pac. 517 (1926); Bowles v. Payne, 251 S.W. 101 (Mo. App. 1923);
Corbett v. Smeraldo, 91 N.J. Law 29, 102 Atl. 889 (1918); National Liberty Ins.
Co. of America v. Sturtevant-Jones Co., 116 Ohio St. 299, 156 N.E. 446 (1927);
City Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Pluchelt, 37 Ohio App. 423, 175 N.E. 213
(1931); The Coup6 Co. v. Maddick, L.R. 2 Q.B. 413 (1891). Other cases are
collected in Notes (1922) 26 A.L.R. 223, (1927) 52 id. 711, (1931) 45 Harv. L.
Rev. 342, 345. Many of the cases can be distinguished upon two grounds: (1)
whether or not the bailment was gratuitous; (2) whether the servant acted
intentionally or negligently. The liability of the tenant for harm done to the
premises by third persons Is liability for waste. The results reached are often
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situations where the obligor is not responsible even for the ac-
tions of his servants in the narrow sense of the word, as where
he only undertook to put the services of his servant at the dis-
posal of another. In the light of the foregoing, we can properly
conclude that the usual statement to the effect that in contrac-
tual relations the promisor is responsible for actions of servants
and independent contractors is at once too narrow and too
broad.2 1
A plaintiff who institutes suit relying upon the rules of
respondeat superior begins by alleging that a tort was committed
by a designated person and then asserts that the defendant is
liable because he is the master of the tortfeasor. 2 Are these same
allegations necessary where the plaintiff bases his suit on the vio-
lation of a contractual duty? An affirmative answer seems to be
commonly assumed; certainly such is the indication of Section
278 of the German Civil Code, which imposes liability in contrac-
tual situations for the fault of the servant.23 Nevertheless, obser-
vation of the way in which contract cases are handled by the
courts and an analysis of the logical consequences of this theory
both lead to the contrary conclusion. If a large enterprise is sued
for breach of contract, the question as to which member of the
enterprise caused the breach is practically never raised. Still less
debated is the question whether a particular member of the en-
terprise acted wrongfully. The reason is clear: In order to state a
cause of action the plaintiff need only allege non-performance of
the obligation imposed by the contract; he is not required to name
the individual member of the defendant firm who caused the
breach.24
Quite different is the situation in tort cases. Here, in theory
different from those of the civil law jurisdictions, because- at common law a
lease is regarded as an estate. But the stipulations found in the usual con-
tracts of short term leases tend to assimilate the legal relations to those in
the civil law countries.
21. The distinction between contractual and delictual responsibility some-
times has curious consequences; so the liability of a railroad for an accident
happening in the station may depend upon whether or not the injured had
already bought the ticket. Reichsgericht, Feb. 5, 1915, Warn. (1915) 174; Feb.
9, 1933, JW. (1933) 1390.
22. How far the notion of "tort" must be qualified in these cases will be
discussed later, infra p. 12 et seq.
23. German legal writers have rarely noticed the fundamental difficulty.
But see Kress, Lehrbuch des allgemeinen Schuldrechts (1929) 338; A. Nuss-
baum, Haftung fiir Hiilfspersonen (1898) 83. Practically all authors, however,
discuss one question connected with it, namely what degree of care -is
required of the servant.
24. See Pollard v. Coulter, 238 Ala. 377, 191 So. 231 (1939). But cf. Axon v.
Kansas City Public Service Co., 142 S.W. (2d) 342 (Mo. App. 1940).
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at least, the injured person must name the culprit who has com-
mitted the tort. But we must concede that this principle is no
longer observed in such cases as McPherson v. Buick Motor Com-
pany,"5 where it is sought to hold a large enterprise liable for
bringing a dangerous article into the flow of commerce. Further-
more, sometimes it is certain that a servant of the defendant has
committed a tort, but the plaintiff is not in a position to know
his name; as, for example, where an unknown driver of a large
bus company is responsible for a collision. In such a case the Ger-
man courts have dispensed with the requirement of naming the
tortfeasor.8
In contract cases, if recovery rested upon the theory that the
conduct of the servant was wrongful, several logical corollaries
might be expected to follow. The plaintiff should be required to
prove that the act of the servant falls under one of the familiar
types of delictual wrongs, such as assault, trespass, or negligence.
It would further appear that the employer should be permitted to
set up all the defenses available to the servant tortfeasor. From
this it would follow that two standards of wrongfulness would
be applied at the same time: The act of the servant would have
to be wrongful as a violation of the contractual duty owed by the
master to the promisee, and the same act must also be wrongful
as a violation of the servant's duty not to commit torts.2 1
Some examples will illustrate the difficulty of this double
standard: A buyer receives watered milk from the seller. Must
the buyer show not only that the seller violated his duty to fur-
nish good milk, but also that an employee put water in the milk
and that this act was a tort against the buyer? What kind of a
tort would it be, if the employee had acted out of spite against his
master?28 Or another example from the good old times2 9-the
engineer let the train stand for a night in the station. Is the pas-
senger who claims damages for delay in transportation compelled
to prove that the engineer committed a tort against him? Here
again it would be difficult though not impossible for an ingenious
25. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See further, e.g., Bagre v. Daggett
Chocolate Co., 126 Conn. 659, 13 A. (2d) 757 (1940) (basing the decision upon
res ipsa loquitur).
26. Relchsgericht, July 1, 1909, Warn. (1909) 490; March 14, 1910, Warn.
(1910) 193; Nov. 23, 1910, S.A. 66, 348; Dec. 1, 1913, Warn. (1914) 78.
27. Cases where such a double inquiry was undertaken are rare. See, e.g.,
OLG. Hamm, Nov. 26, 1932, JW. (1933) 2015; Relchsgericht, March 31, 1936,
JW. (1936) 2394 (bone splinters in a dish).
28. Stranahan Co. v. Colt, 55 Ohio St. 398, 45 N.E. 634 (1896).
29. Weed v. The Panama R.R., 17 N.Y. 362 (1858).
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interpretation to qualify the conduct of the engineer as a tort
against the passenger. The same difficulty will be met if an em-
ployed salesman has sold an article under the price which the
employer had promised another competitor to maintain. 0 How is
it possible to qualify the act of the salesman as a tort against the
competitor, if he did not owe him any duty? True, the American
courts3 l as well as the German ones 32 have developed a rule that
the violation of a contractual duty may constitute at the same
time a tort against third persons injured thereby. 8 But it would
be a strangely circuitous way of reasoning to say that the prom-
isee has to allege the breach of the contract existing between
master and servant, to conclude from that breach that the servant
has committed a tort and then to derive from the servant's lia-
bility that of the master." Under this theory too the plaintiff has
to allege and prove the breach of a contract, but strangely enough
instead of the breach of the contract he has concluded the breach
of the contract existing between master and servant.
Further, if in contract cases the master were liable for the
tort of the servant and not for the violation of his own con-
tractual duty, he could assert as a defense that the servant was
insane, et cetera, and hence not responsible. It is doubtful
whether this kind of defense is available to the master in tort
cases; that it is excluded in contract cases seems to be certain.6
If the common rules of respondeat superior were applicable
in contract cases, we would expect to find in these cases the cor-
ollary proposition that the master is liable for such harmful acts
30. This example is used by Siber in Planck's Commentaries, note 2b to §
278 for a different argument. The case of Greyhound Corp. v. Commercial
Casualty Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 317, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 239 (1940) is another
authority for the proposition that the agent causing the breach of a contract
must not have committed a tort.
31. Casement v. Brown, 148 U.S. 615, 13 S.Ct. 672, 37 L.Ed. 582 (1893).
32. Reichsgericht, JW. (1903) Beilage No. 21; Nov. 12, 1910, Warn. (1911)
32; Dec. 2, 1910, JW. (1911) 182; June 22, 1912, Warn. (1912) 420; Oct. 21, 1937,
RGZ. 156, 193; Oct. 21, 1937, JW. (1938) 176. Cf. Bandmann, JW. (1939) 604.
33. Kessler, Die Fahrliissigheit im nordamerikanischen Deliktsrecht
(1932) 104. But under a widely accepted doctrine an agent is liable only in the
case of misfeasance, not of non-feasance. See, e.g., Ryan v. Standard Oil Co.
of Indiana, 144 S.W. (2d) 170, 172 (Mo. App. 1940).
34. See, e.g., Aldrich v. Boston & Worster R.R., 100 Mass. 31 (1868). Stored
goods were burned in a warehouse. Would it be of any importance that one
of the employees owed the owners of the warehouse the duty to save the
goods and consequently that he was guilty of negligence in not saving them?
35. This is indeed the opinion of Wilburg, supra note 8, at 664, and
Ferrara, supra note 17, at 518. The correct view has been expressed by
Becqu6, supra note 15, at 304.
36. Consequently the master can be held liable although the servant has
been absolved. Pollard v. Coulter, 238 Ala. 421, 191 So. 231 (1939).
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of the servant only as were committed within the scope of his
employment. 8 However, the master has been held for acts of his
servant which could not be included in even the broadest defini-
tion of the term, "within the scope of his employment." '8 It is the
prevailing opinion that a promisor who owes a special duty of
protection as, for example, a carrier or restaurant keeper, is liable
for an assault by one of his servants even if it is committed out
of purely personal motives.8 9
It is not premature to conclude that the rules of respondeat
superior are not applicable in contract cases, but are replaced by
other principles governing the responsibility of the contractual
obligor for breach of contract. Thus, there immediately arises the
problem of distinguishing contract cases from simple tort cases.
Up to the present the term "contractual duty" has been em-
ployed in the narrowest sense of the word. But it is possible and
even probable that in this connection the import of the term has
to be enlarged.40 It may be necessary to include pre-contractual
obligations 41 and certain other definite duties which the law im-
poses irrespective of the consent of the parties, such as the duties
owed by a guardian to his ward.42
On the basis of the experience of the civil law courts it might
be expected that the field of application of the contract rules gov-
erning the liability for dependent persons will be expanded in
37. Pollock, The Law of Torts (13 ed. 1929) 90. Contra: Ferrara, supra
note 17, at 521; Soarec, op. cit. supra note 17, at 24.
38. Schmidt v. New Orleans R.R., 116 La. 311, 40 So. 714 (1906); Pratt v.
Martin, 183 Ark. 365, 35 S.W. (2d) 1004 (1931); Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180
(1870); Vannah v. Hart Private Hospital, 228 Mass. 132, 117 N.E. 328 (1917);
Dwinelle v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., 120 N.Y. 117, 24 N.E. 319 (1890);
National Liberty Ins. Co. of America v. Sturtevant-Jones Co., 116 Ohio St.
299, 156 N.E. 446 (1927); Craker v. The Chicago & N.W. R.R., 36 Wis. 657
(1875). See further the interesting dissent of Justice Seawell in Robinson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 216 N.E. 322, 324, 4 S.E. (2d) 889, 890 (1939).
39. Cf. infra note 43.
40. Ferrara, supra note 17, at 407.
41. The Reichsgericht assumes that the master Is liable for the breach
of precontractual duties by the servant. Reichsgericht, Jan. 12, 1915, JW.
(1915) 240; Oct. 19, 1921, RGZ. 103, 47; July 12, 1923, RGZ. 107, 240; June 23,
1926, RGZ. 114, 155; Feb. 19, 1931, RGZ. 131, 343. Contra: 1 H. Mazeaud et L.
Mazeaud, op. cit. supra note 15, at 967. Why should a contract not have "after
effects"? A negative answer is implied in Central Ry. v. Peacock, 69 Md. 257,
14 Atl. 709 (1888); Palmer v. Winston-Salem Ry. & Electric Co., 131 N.C. 250,
42 S.E. 604 (1902). A somewhat similar extension is to be seen in the rule
that the liability of a carrier is not dependent upon the contract but upon
the receiving of the injured for carriage. Foulkes v. The Metropolitan District
Ry., L.R. 5 C.P. 157, 164 (1880); Harris v. Perry & Co. (1903) 2 K.B. 219. As
to merchandise see Hayn, Roman & Co. v. Culliford, L.R. 4 C.P. 182 (1879).
42. Or the duty which the trustee in bankruptcy owes the bankrupt:
Reichsgericht, Sept. 7, 1936, RGZ. 152, 125; or the duty that an association
owes its members: Relchsgericht, Feb. 28, 1927, JW. (1938) 1329.
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still other ways. Contracts will be construed as creating collateral
duties toward both the promisee himself 43 and third persons."
43. Examples: The duty of the employer to furnish a reasonably safe
working place [Dieters v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., 86 Minn. 474, 91 N.W. 15
(1902)]. If in many cases, e.g., in Pantzar v. The Tilly Foster Mining Co., 99
N.Y. 368, 2 N.E. 24 (1885) and Wilsons Clyde Coal Co. v. English [1938] A.C.
57, this duty has been regarded as non-delegable, the reason seems to be
that it was founded upon a contract. The same position has been taken by
Reichsarbeitsgericht, June 5, 1940, JW. (1940) 1788. Similarly a stevedore
-company has to transport its workers safely to the working place: Maryland
Dredging Contracting Co. v. Maryland, 262 Fed. 11 (C.C.A. 4th, 1919), where
again the duty was regarded as non-delegable.
See the following cases with respect to the duty of the carrier to bring
passengers safely to the place of destination and to protect them: New Jer-
sey Steamboat Co. v. Brockett, 121 U.S. 637, 7 S.Ct. 1039, 30 L.Ed. 1049 (1887);
Lafitte v. New Orleans City and Lake R.R., 43 La. Ann. 34, 8 So. 701 (1890);
Seawell V. Carolina Cent. R.R., 133 N.C. 515, 45 S.E. 850 (1903) (mob violence).
But cf. Readhead v. The Midland Ry., L.R. 4 Q.B. 379 (1869); Ch. req. June 28,
1916, Sirey 1922.1.325n; Ch. civ. May 10, 1921, July 25, 1922; Ch. req. July 31,
1922, Sirey 1922.1.324. The word absolute liability must be accepted with cau-
tion. See New Orleans and Northeastern R.R. v. Jopes, 142 U.S. 18, 12 S.Ct.
109, 35 L.Ed. 919 (1891).
Duties of the restaurant keeper and hotel owner to protect customers:
Curran v. Olson, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N.W. 1124 (1903); Stott v. Churchill, 15 Misc.
80, 36 N.Y. Supp. 476 (1895), affirmed 157 N.Y. 692, 51 N.E. 104 (1898); Beilke
v. Carroll, 51 Wash. 395, 98 Pac. 1119 (1909); Maclenan v. Segar [1917] 2 K.B.
325; Campbell v. Shelbourne Hotel [1939] 2 K.B. 534. If such a duty exists it
cannot matter whether the employee committing the assault indulged in
private vengeance or tried to enforce the payment as was assumed in John-
son v. Monson, 183 Cal. 149, 190 Pac. 635 (1920); Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106
Wis. 434, 82 N.W. 304 (1900). If in the "hot foot" cases some courts [e.g., Peter
Anderson & Co. v. Diaz, 77 Ark. 606, 92 S.W. 861 (1906); Sullivan v. Crowley,
155 Mass. 188, 29 N.E. (2d) 769 (1940)] denied the liability of the barkeeper,
they apparently disregarded this duty of protection.
The duty of a department store to protect customers: Rumetsch v. Wan-
amaker, 216 N.Y. 379, 110 N.E. 760 (1915) (duty to inspect the elevator non-
delegable); Reichsgericht, Dec. 7, 1911, RGZ. 78, 239. Contra: *Smothers v.
Welch & Co., 310 Mo. 144, 274 S.W. 678 (1925); McKeighan v. Kline's Inc., 339
Mo. 523, 98 S.W. (2d) 555 (1936).
Duty of the entrepreneur of a theatre, show, or race to protect specta-
tors: Francis v. Cockrell, L.R. 5 Q.B. 184, 501 (1870); Welsh & Wife v. Can-
terbury and Paragon Ltd. [1894] T.L.R. 878, qualified in Cox v. Coulson
[1916] 2 K.B. 177 and Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 K.B. 205;
Grand Morgan Theatre Co. v. Kearney, 40 F.(2d) 235 (C.C.A. 8th, 1930); Law-
son v. Clawson, 177 Md. 333, 9 A.(2d) 755 (1939); Canney v. Rochester Agri-
cultural & Mfg. Ass'n, 76 N.H. 60, 79 Atl. 517 (1911) (no contractual rela-
tions); Richmond & M.R.R. v. Moore's Adm'r, 94 Va. 493, 27 S.E. 70 (1897);
Handley v. Anacortes Ice Co., 5 Wash.(2d) 384, 105 P.(2d) 505 (1940). But see
Wiersma v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. App.(2d) 8, 106 P.(2d) 45 (1940);
Cour d'appel de Riom, Nov. 20, 1931, Sirey 1932.2.113. This reasoning would
justify the result reached by the Tribunal correctionnel de Mantes, June 15,
1933, Sirey 1933.2.233; Reichsgericht, Sept. 27, 1904, RGZ. 22, 59; Reichsgericht,
March 4, 1930, RGZ. 127, 313. Under this point of view It would not be neces-
sary to inquire whether the driver of the racing motorcycle acted negligently,
as the Reichsgericht did in this decision under the above criticized wording
of Section 278 of the German Civil Code.
Duty of a waterwork towards customers Invited to its premises: Munick
v. City of Durham, 181 N.C. 188, 106 S.E. 665 (1921).
The telegraph company does not owe to its customers the duty to write
their dispatches: Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 65 Tex. 220 (1885).
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One last remark is necessary: When it is said that the rules
of respondeat superior are not applicable in contract cases, we do
not mean that the injured party cannot rely upon these rules even
if he is able to allege facts which call for their application; 5 but
rather that he can invoke other and broader principles if he is
able to allege the breach of a contractual duty, and that he can
so forestall the usual defenses implicit in the doctrine of respon-
deat superior.
III. THE NATURE OF THE SERVANT'S ACT
In Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Company" a wife who was
injured through the negligence of her husband was allowed to
recover from the latter's employer, although she could not have
maintained suit successfully against the husband himself. This is
rightly regarded as a leading case in the common law; and it
appears to be a signpost for future development. It points toward
the abolition of the principle that the husband is not liable to his
wife in tort. This principle has apparently been regarded with
Duty of protection of a hospital towards the customers: Vannah v. Hart
Private Hospital, 228 Mass. 132, 117 N.E. 328 (1917).
That different types of contracts entail different kinds of collateral duties
has been clearly pointed out in Brady v. Chicago & G.W. Ry., 114 Fed. 100,
103, 104 (C.C.A. 8th, 1902). As to the interpretation of forwarding contracts,
see Reichsgericht, Feb. 2, 1918, RGZ. 94, 97, Dec. 6, 1924, RGZ. 109, 288; Dec.
10, 1924, RGZ. 109, 299. For the interpretation of contracts concluded with
brokers, see Reichsgericht, March 2, 1912, RGZ. 78, 310. In Haskell v. Boston
Dist. Messenger Co., 190 Mass. 189, 76 N.E. 215 (1906), the court's interpreta-
tion of the contract was that it did not entail an obligation to carry goods
but merely'to place a messenger at the promisee's disposal.
44. The German and French courts are far more inclined than the courts
of the common law countries to assume obligations for the benefit of third
persons. They assume that a lessor contracts not only for himself but also
for members of his family: Reichsgericht, Feb. 21, 1921, Warn.(1921) 114;
Cour d'appel de Lyon, Oct. 3, 1938, Sirey 1938.2.149. Contra: Eberle v. Produc-
tive Building & Loan Association of Newark, 119 N.J. Law 393, 196 Atl. 666
(1938); Velthuysen v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 17 N.J. Misc. 376, 9
A.(2d) 634 (1939); Monahan v. Baime, 16 A.(2d) 337 (N.J. 1940) (withdrawn
by order of court); Cavalier v. Pope [1906]A.C. 428; Fairman v. Perpetual
Investment Building Society [1923] A.C. 74. It may be regretted that the rule
of Miller v. Hancock [1893] 2 Q.B. 177 has not been further developed. The
following cases afford further instances where contractual obligations toward
third persons were assumed: Reichsgericht, Nov. 26, 1936, JW. (1937) 737;
Radel Co. v. Borches, 147 Ky. 506, 145 S.W. 155 (1912). The case Sciolaro v.
Asch, 198 N.Y. 77, 91 N.E. 263 (1910) could be explained by such an assump-
tion, but it construes an invitation. The case Griffen v. Manice, 166 N.Y. 188,
59 N.E. 925 (1901) shows that it may be necessary for the third person to
base his action on tort. An extreme case is Oberster. Gerichtshof Wien, March
8, 1932, SZ. 14, 214. See further 2 Savatier, op. cit. supra note 15, at 120, no 540.
45. We still less mean that the contract theory can explain all cases
where the standard of liability was raised above that of the rules of respon-
deat superior. Cf. Note (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 342, 346.
46. 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
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great disfavor by the courts." To abandon it outright would have
involved too abrupt a departure from tradition, but to restrict its
application was possible and this was done in the Schubert case.
The rationale of the case, however, indicates only that a third
person-the employer, the insurer, the husband's creditors or
his heirs-should not profit from the fact that the husband is
immune to suit by the wife. The position that the husband him-
self should not be required to pay damages to his wife, since he
must support her anyway, may still be regarded as reasonable.
Under the principle of the Schubert case the employer is
liable even though the servant himself is free from responsibility.
Although it is true that the question whether the master may
have recourse against the husband remained open in that deci-
sion, it may be assumed that this procedure either was legally ex-
cluded or was economically impractical; otherwise the wife would
not have instituted suit against the employer. Can we regard the
Schubert case as the first step toward a broader principle under
which the master might be held for acts of the servant, although
the servant himself is immune to liability? A reference to the
German law suggests that such a development is possible, and
probably even desirable. Section 831 of the German Civil Code
has been interpreted to mean that the master is liable in all cases
where the servant has committed what would be, except for some
personal disability, a tort. The result is reached by a highly tech-
nical distinction between "objective" and "subjective" factors,
which need not be considered here.4 8 For present purposes it
suffices to say that the master is liable if the servant has violated
47. Liability of husband's employer denied: Maine v. James Maine & Son,
198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924); Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 Atl.
669 (1932); Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.(2d) 99 (1940);
Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 N.W. 290 (1927); Emerson v. Western Seed
& Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927); Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn.
415, 55 S.W. (2d) 263 (1932). Affirmed: Webster v. Snyder, 103. Fla. 1131, 138 So.
755 (1932); Broaddus v. Wilkenson, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S.W. (2d) 1052 (1940); Mc-
Laurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877 (1933); Rosen-
blum v. Rosenblum, 231 Mo. App. 276, 96 S.W.(2d) 1082 (1936); Hudson v. Gas
Consumers' Ass'n, 123 N.J. Law 252, 8 A.(2d) 337 (1939), noted in (1939) 88
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 365; Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E.
42 (1928); Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 Atl. 792 (1935); Poulin v. Gra-
ham, 108 Vt. 307, 147 Atl. 698 (1929). Liability of the father's employer af-
firmed: MiLady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908, 116 A.L.R.
639 (1938); Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 Atl.
107 (1930); Le Sage v. Le Sage, 224 Wis. 57, 271 N.W. 369 (1937). Denied:
Myers v. Tranquillity Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App.(2d) 385, 79 P.(2d) 419 (1938);
Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933). For other cases, see
Note (1938) 116 A.L.R. 646.
48. The inherent difficulties are shown by Deetz, supra note 3, at 172
et seq.
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a duty and caused harm thereby, but is not responsible himself
because of some subjective reason, such as insanity. The lan-
guage of the code, though suggesting this interpretation, does not
require it; consequently, it may safely be said that it appeared to
the Supreme Court more reasonable and just. These same consid-
erations would operate in common law jurisdictions to effect an
extension of the principle of the Schubert case. Of course, the
requirement that the servant must have committed a wrongful
act is not to be abandoned lest the liability of the master is to be
expanded indefinitely. But the question remains, which of the
specific defenses available to the servant shall be denied to the
master? The defense arising out of the husband-wife relationship
certainly appears to fall within this group. Whether other de-
fenses, such as insanity,49 will be added is a question whose an-
swer depends largely upon the creative instinct of the courts.
Further prediction is not possible at this time.
IV. SERVANTS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES
In modem society the division of labor has progressed to the
point where everybody makes extensive use of the services of
countless other persons. We all have numerous employees in this
sense of the word; but. of course it does not follow that we are
responsible for the torts of all the persons whose services accrue
beneficially to us. In all legal systems it thus becomes necessary
to define the term "servant" in order to ascertain the employees
for whose conduct the employer is liable.50 But in none has a clear
notion of "servant" been worked out and accepted; indeed, it is
difficult to find even a consistent policy which has been followed
in definition. Several reasons may have caused this confusion.
One reason, of, course,, is the social lag that too often exists be-
tween the state of the law and the new social and economic
conditions to which law must be applied. The traditional textbook
titles referring to the master's liability for the acts of his servants
still betray the social conditions and prevailing ideas out of
which the rules of respondeat superior first emerged-even the
term respondeat superior is revealing in this connection. The
domestic servant, the farmhand, the groom, the journeyman-
these were the persons for whose empty purses the chest of the
49. In New Orleans and Northeastern Ry. v. Jopes, 142 U.S. 18, 12 S.Ct.
109, 35 L.Ed. 919 (1891), the defense of self defense of the servant was allowed
in a contract case. In Davis v. Merril, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922), the lia-
bility of the master was affirmed although the servant was insane.
50. Cf. Steffen, supra note 1, at 528.
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master was substituted.5 1 This, at the time, did not seem unjust
to the master, for the relationship between master and servant
was so close and the dependence of the servant so thorough that
it was safe to conclude that whenever the servant was at fault,
the master probably was at fault also. At the present time the
imposition of absolute liability on the employer is still thought to
be socially desirable, although the exercise in fact of personal
supervision by the master is a thing which is disappearing with
the civilization that engendered it. It follows that the rationale
behind our present concept of liability of the master for the torts
of the servant deserves to be newly examined and redefined.5 2
Despite the general confusion, there is, on some points at least,
substantial agreement between all legal systems. The feature that
is supposed to distinguish the master-servant relationship in legal
contemplation is the right and possibility of the master's control
over the conduct of the servant. But reality does not correspond
to the words.53 There are many cases where the liability of the
master has remained unquestioned despite the fact that all idea
of control by the master was pure fiction. The employer is liable
for the acts of managing directors and higher employees,5' as well
as for the conduct of workmen who exercise special skills and are
possessed of technical knowledge far beyond the master's reach
of understanding." A different treatment is found only in the case
of a few specialists-such as doctors and nurses, 56 attorneys,"
51. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 3 Select Essays in Anglo-
American History (1909) 520 et seq.
52. For a discussion of the difficulties which have arisen under the Ger-
man Civil Code, see Jovy, supra note 3, at 84; Kommentar der Reichsgerichts-
rdte, § 831, n. 2.
53. Accord: Steffen, supra note 1, at 507.
54. Metzler v. Layton, 373 Ill. 88, 25 N.E.(2d) 60 (1939) (office manager).
The act of conversion committed by a managing director is the act of the
bank: Marietta Trust & Banking Co. v. Faw, 31 Ga. App. 507, 121 S.E. 277
(1924); Grenada Bank v. Moore, 131 Miss. 339, 95 So. 449 (1923); Citizens
Bank of Coldwater v. Callicott, 178 Miss. 747, 174 So. 78 (1937). But the Ch.
crim., Feb. 26, 1937, Sirey 1938.1.145, denied the responsibility for the torts of
a director because there was no control. Contra: Conseil d'Etat, Nov. 22, 1907,
Sirey 1910.3.15. Cf. White's Lumber & Supply Co. v. Collins, 186 Miss. 659, 191
So. 105 (1939). 1 Savatier, op. cit. supra note 15, at 398 (against the view of
the text); Seavey, op. cit. supra note 14, at 451.
55. See, e.g., Reichsgericht, Feb. 22, 1937, JW. (1937) 1964; 6 Planiol-Ri-
pert-Esmein, Trait6 de Droit Civil Frangais (1930) 873, no 646.
56. Pearl v. West End St. Ry., 176 Mass. 177, 57 N.E. 339 (1900). It is
difficult to reconcile the case of Hillyer v. The Governors of St. Bartholo-
mew's Hospital [1909] 2 K.B. 820 with the case of County Council of the
Parts of Lindsey v. Marshall [1937] A.C. 97 except by assuming that the lat-
ter case is a contract case. Reichsgericht, Jan. 4, 1912, JW. (1912) 338 (as to
matters requiring professional training). Cour d'appel de Bordeaux, July 31,
1878, Sirey 1879.2.15; Feb. 6, 1900, Dalloz 1900.2.470; Tribunal civil de la Seine,
June 6, 1906, Sirey 1907.2.22; Tribunal civil de Marseille, Feb. 10, 1938, Sirey
i
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police officers, and officers of the court." The reason for the ex-
1938.2.52 (not if the tort is not connected with the exercise of medical tech-
nique). Contra: Cour d'appel de Paris, Feb. 24, 1893, Sirey 1893.2.72; Cour
d'appel de Bourges, April 14, 1902, Sirey 1902.2.208; Cour d'appel de Lyon, Dec.
19, 1903, Sirey 1904.2.112; Cour d'appel de Pau, June 30, 1931, Sirey 1913.2.277.
The contradiction can be in part explained away by assuming that the basis
of the latter group of cases was the violation of a contractual obligation.
According to Reichsgericht, Aug. 2, 1935, JW. (1935) 3540, nurses are to be
treated as ordinary employees.
The argument if sound at all ought to be applied in contract cases also.
But here usually the problem is put in another way: Did the promisor (in
most cases a hospital) promise medical care or to put at the promisee's dis-
posal doctors and nurses? Hardly a better instance for the proposition that
the interpretation of contracts is a matter of value judgments can be found;
for even if the hospital owner had expressly promised medical care, which
he usually does not, one could object that nobody can promise so highly
personal a performance of another. The tendency of the courts to adopt the
first interpretation can be explained only by the desire to give the injured
a defendant who is financially responsible and who can easily be brought
before court. The possibility of this double interpretation is seen everywhere,
but nowhere is a method for finding the right one indicated. Hall v. Lees[1904] 2 K.B. 602, 611; Evans v. Mayor & C. of Liverpool [1906] 1 K.B. 160,
166; Farwell, J., in Hillyer v. The Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hospital[1909] 2 K.B. 820, 827; Reichsgerlcht, June 30, 1936, JW. (1936) 3182.
Examples of the first interpretation: Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital,
2 A.(2d) 761 (N.H. 1939); Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 52 App. Div. 624, 65
N.Y. Supp. 1135 (1900), affirmed 167 N.Y. 244, 60 N.E. 597 (1901) (department
store); Giusti v. C. H. Weston Co., 108 P.(2d) 1010 (Ore. App. 1941); Cour
d'appel de Dijon, March 18, 1903, Sirey 1906.2.17; Reichsgericht, Oct. 30, 1906,
RGZ. 64, 231, almost constantly followed by the Supreme Court. Oberster
Gerichtshof Wien, April 30, 1937 (Austria, 1937) 55 Zentralblatt fUr die juris-
tische Praxis 571.
Examples of the second interpretation: York v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry.,
98 Iowa 544, 67 N.W. 574 (1896); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 211
N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188,
146 N.E. 199 (1924) (orderly); Marshall v. Lindsey County Council [1935] 1
K.B. 516 (but liability was affirmed on other grounds); Strangeways-Lesmer
v. Clayton [1936] 2 K.B. 11 (nurse); Oberster Gerichtshof Wien, Dec. 19, 1930,
SZ. 12, 709; Oct. 29, 1930, SZ. 12, 840.
Steamship companies are supposed not to promise medical care but only
to put doctors at the passenger's disposal: O'Brien v. Cunnard S.S. Co., 154
Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891); Allan v. State S.S. Co., 132 N.Y. 91, 30 N.E. 482
(1892).
Most of the American cases in point are concerned with another prob-
lem: How far are charitable institutions responsible? See Zollmann, Damage
Liability of Charitable Institutions (1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 395.
Is a doctor responsible for the faults of another doctor who represents
him during his vacation? No: Myers v. Holborn, 56 N.J. Law 193, 33 AtI. 389(1895). Yes: Cour d'appel de Paris, June 26, 1919, Sirey 1922.2.113. The com-
pany is liable for a fraudulent representation of the company doctor: Wood-
burn v. Handard Forgings Corp., 112 F.(2d) 271 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940).
57. Reichsgericht, Oct. 29, 1937, RGZ. 156, 208 (contract case); Marsh v.
Joseph [1897] 1 Ch. 213; Slingsby v. District Bank [1932] 1 K.B. 544. These
decisions are not based on the argument of the text. Oberster Gerichtshof
Wien, Sept. 30, 1903, GlUnF. 2447.
58. Police officers placed at the disposal of a private enterprise or the
sponsor of a show: St. Louis I.M. & S. R.R. v. Hackett, 58 Ark. 381, 24 S.W.
881 (1894) (making a distinction as to whether the sheriff wanted to dis-
charge his public or his private duties); Tolchester Beach Imp. Co. v. Stein-
meier, 72 Md. 313, 20 AtI. 188 (1890); Kirkpatrick v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 338
Pa. 126, 12 A. (2d) 22 (1940).
Teachers have been regarded as servants. Smith v. Martin and the Cor-
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ception here seems to be that the courts wish to vest these profes-
sions with a special independence. The employer who is aware
that he is liable for the conduct of the employee will likely be
impelled to regulate, and hence to interfere with, the latter's ac-
tivities. The undesirability of this interference in the case of
professional conduct has impressed the courts so much that they
have eliminated one of its sources.
Since the older idea of responsibility for persons under con-
trol no longer explains satisfactorily the bulk of decided cases, a
new interpretation must be sought. Under the common law and
the French law, which hold the employer regardless of his per-
sonal fault, the function of the doctrine of respondeat superior is
to make the employer bear certain risks." They are shifted from
the injured person to the employer. 0 According to Douglas6' and
Savatier, 2 who seem to have arrived at the most plausible expla-
nation, the liability for the acts of servants is a part of the price
one has to pay for participating in economic life in the role of an
entrepreneur." This interpretation explains why the housewife-
the typical consumer-is not responsible for the acts of the
plumber 64 whom she has called in for repair work, while, on the
poration of Kingston-upon-Hull [1911] 2 K.B. 775; Ch. civ., Oct. 25, 1886,
Sirey 1887.1.4571 (asking whether the order to which the teacher belonged
had the right to give instructions).
As to non-commissioned officers and privates put at the disposal of asso-
ciations sponsoring military training, see Ch. req. Aug. 6, 1907, Sirey 1908.1.
281; Cour d'appel d'Amiens, May 29, 1935, Slrey 1935.2.239.
If the responsibility for architects and building engineers has been de-
nied, the reason seems to be that they were independent contractors. See
Burke v. Ireland, 166 N.Y. 305, 59 N.E. 914 (1901). Contra: Grote v. The
Chester and Holyhead Ry., 2 Ex. 251, 154 Eng. Reprint 485 (1848); Claffy v.
Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 249 Ill. 210, 94 N.E. 551 (1911). Cf. 6 Planlol-
Ripert-Esmein, Trait6 pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1930) 875, no 648.
59. The theorie du risque has been discussed with particular thorough-
ness in France. Colin et Capitant, 2 Cours Elementaire de Droit Civil Fran-
gais (8 ed. 1934) and 1 H. Mazeaud et L. Mazeaud, op. cit. supra note 15, at
937, no 932 et seq., deny that the responsibility for the servants can be re-
garded as an application of this theory.
60. Smith, Frolic and Detour (1923) 23 Col. L. Rev. 444, 456.
61. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38
Yale L. J. 584, 595, 720, 722.
62. The difference between Douglas and Savatier lies in the fact that
the latter distinguishes the servant and the entrepreneur by the legal nature
of the contract with the employer.
63. A similar view has been expressed already by Riimelin, Schadenser-
satz ohne Verschulden (1910) 27, 29. The older German literature is equally
replete with attempts to justify the liability for servants in general.
64. Or other craftsmen, for example: Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 586
(1873); Ch. crim., June 28, 1934, Sirey 1934.1.317 (mechanic who has to repair
an automobile); Reichsgericht, Nov. 13, 1909, JW. (1910) 11 (building con-
tractor); Relchsgericht, June 13, 1910, JW. (1910) 747 (roof repair); Reichs-
gericht, Feb. 14, 1931, JW. (1932) 1210; Reichsgericht, Dec. 17, 1935, JW. (1936)
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other hand, the operator of a factory is liable for the misconduct
of the plumber employed on the factory pay roll. On this analysis
the entrepreneur is liable for all persons, except other entrepre-
neurs, whom he employs; the consumer is liable only for servants
in the popular sense of the word. For the old rule, of course,
retains not only its legal validity but its social and economic
raison d'6tre so long as this kind of relationship still exists.6 5
The uncertainty of the entrepreneur test is not a valid objec-
tion so long as the other tests are no less uncertain. Being quite
as bad in that respect the control test has the additional disad-
vantage of failing to jibe with the actual results of the cases.
Whether the entrepreneur test is one which is workable can be
determined only after it has been applied to typical situations as
they are brought before the courts. Insofar as we can judge from
the cases, the application of the test would not prove to be ex-
tremely difficult. Of course there will be numerous borderline sit-
uations, such as that of the salesman,"6 who seems to be an entre-
preneur only if he works for different firms, 7 or the cases of
sharecroppers," insurance agents,6 9 and lessees of filling stations."
It must be admitted that other doubtful situations are certain to
arise; this, however, is a defect which the entrepreneur theory
644; Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, June 18, 1930, Vazny 10003 (mason);
March 8, 1935, Vazny 14237 (farmer engaging a man with a steam thresher);
Nov. 18, 1924, Vazny 4376 (farmer engaging a man with a steam plough).
Most of these cases may be explained by the assumption that the tortfeasor
was an entrepreneur.
65. Smith, supra note 60, at 459, thinks it is unjustifiable.
66. Regarded as servant: Nichols v. G. L. Hight Motor Co., 63 Ga. App.
155, 10 S.E. (2d) 439 (1940); Leuis v. National Cash Register Co., 84 N.J. Law
598, 87 Atl. 345 (1913); Dishman v. Whitney, 121 Wash. 157, 209 Pac. 12 (1922).
Contra: Barton v. Studebaker Corp., 46 Cal. App. 707, 189 Pac. 1025 (1920);
Lee v. Nanny, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 90, 100 P. (2d) 832 (1940); Meece v. Holland
Furnace Co., 269 Ill. 164 (1933); Pickens v. Diecker, 21 Ohio St. 212 (1871);
Griffith v. Electrolux Corp., 176 Va. 378, 11 S.E. (2d) 644 (1940); Ch. req., May
3, 1933, Sirey 1933.1.208. In the case, Ch. civ., June 16, 1936, Sirey 1936.1.321,
the agent seems to have had an independent enterprise. A dealer charged to
sell one's automobile is, of course, not a servant. Ch. crim., Jan. 9, 1931, Dalloz
1931.1.171.
It is surprising that In Samson v. Aitchison [1912] A.C. 844 the pros-
pective buyer of a motor car and her son were regarded as "servants."
A messenger boy is, of course, a servant: Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v.
Murell, 180 Ky. 52, 201 S.W. 462 (1918).
67. 9 Savatier, op. cit. supra note 15, at 395, no 301; or if he had only an
opportunity to sell for the "master," as in the case of Houdek v. Gloyd, 152
Kan. 789, 107 P. (2d) 751 (1940). The owner of a state-wide sales organization
with its own employees is, of course, not a servant: R. E. Cox Dry Goods
Co. v. Kellog, 145 S.W. (2d) 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
68. Powers v. Whelass, 193 S.C. 364, 9 S.E. (2d) 129 (1940).
69. Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P. (2d) 191 (1940).
70. Donovan v. Standard Oil Corporation of Louisiana, 197 So. 320 (La.
App. 1940); Horan v. Richfield Oil Corp., 105 P. (2d) 514 (Ariz. App. 1940).
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shares with all its competitors. The fact remains that the propo-
nents of this test have indicated a way which leads to results that
are rationally understandable, even though they cannot always
be predicted definitely in advance.
The entrepreneur test has the further advantage of lending
itself to an economic interpretation. That legal devices which are
used to conceal the economic situation7 1 must be disregarded is a
principle which is applied in many fields of the law, e. g., in
workmen's compensation cases, or if the entire stock of a com-
pany is owned by one person or another company. As a test re-
ferring to the economic situation the entrepreneur test has ipso
facto embraced this principle.72
One class of cases where the application of the entrepreneur
test would probably be very difficult is at least partly covered by
special rules, namely the fraud of agents, i. e., persons entrusted
with legal transactions.7 3 One agrees that the responsibility is not
dependent upon the agent's position as servant or not.74 The in-
quiry is shifted to another problem: How far does the authority
given to the agent cover deceits committed in the transaction, and
71. Different methods of concealing economic dependence have been
shown by Steffen, supra note 1, at 519 et seq. See further Monetti v. Standard
Oil Co., 195 So. 89 (La. App. 1940). The qualification which the parties them-
selves give to their relations should be reviewed more skeptically than was
done in Clark v. Lynch, 139 S.W. (2d) 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), or in Mabry
v. Swift & Co., 145 S.W. (2d) 163 (Mo. App. 1940). The correct point of view
has been expressed in Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Scaletta, 200 Ark. 645, 654,
140 S.W. (2d) 684, 689 (1940).
72. Similar considerations may be the true reasons behind the decisions
In Ch. req., Aug. 1, 1866, Dalloz 1867.1.26; March 4, 1903, Sirey 1903.1.471. A
typical situation where the courts would go behind a fictitious legal inde-
pendence is that of taxi drivers: Cour de Paris, July 3, 1923, Dalloz 1924.2.48.
Ch. crim., Jan. 23, 1931, Sirey 1931.1.354. Contra: McColligan v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 214 Pa. 229, 63 Atl. 792 (1906). In London the situation is covered by
statute: King v. London Improved Cab Co., L.R. 23 Q.B. 281 (1889); Bygraves
v. Dicker [1923] 2 K.B. 585. As to New York, see Cargill v. Duffy, 123 Fed.
721 (S.D. N.Y. 1903).
73. Ralston Purina Co. v. Novak, 111 F. (2d) 631 (C.C.A. 8th, 1940).
74. Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117, 142 N.E. 695 (1890); Swire v. Fran-
cis, 3 App. Cas. 106 (1877); Kettlewell v. Refuge Assurance Co. [1908] 1 K.B.
545, 552; A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Agency (1933) § 256 et seq. Sub-
scriptions to shares have been treated differently: Houldsworth v. City of
Glasgow Bank, L.R. 5 App. Cas. 317 (1880); Addie v. The Western Bank of
Scotland, L.R. 1 Sc. & D. App. Cas. 145 (1868); Lynde v. Anglo-Italian Hemp
Spinning Co. [1896] 1 Ch. 178.
But liability for an agent's malicious prosecution has been made to de-
pend upon whether he was merely agent or independent contractor in Wane-
lik v. Franklin Auto Supply Co., 10 A. (2d) 349 (R.I. 1940).
Examples of German cases in point: Reichsgericht, June 11, 1909, RGZ.
71, 217; June 7, 1910, RGZ. 73, 434; March 25, 1918, RGZ. 92, 345. See further
1 Savatier, op. cit. supra note 15, at 399, no 302.
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above that, can a fraud consisting in the false assertion of author-
ity create the pretended but non-existing authority?"
V. LIABILITY FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
The courts constantly increase the number of situations in
which employers are held responsible for the torts of independent
contractors employed by them. Does this disclose a trend toward
a general principle of responsibility for all employees?" If it
were, any effort to define the "servant" would be futile. The an-
swer to this question must be based upon a correct interpretation
of the cases in which liability is imposed upon the employer for
the wrongs of independent contractors. These cases should not be
regarded solely as expressions of a tendency toward the imposi-
tion of unlimited responsibility. It is equally possible that they
represent situations wherein special interests have demanded
special regulations. Here again the comparative method may
prove helpful. If it can be shown that under other legal systems
similar situations have been met by the imposition of unusually
strict liability, we may be justified in assuming that it is the con-
flict of particular interests that has demanded the exceptional
liability.
The first group of decisions imposing responsibility for the
acts or omissions of the independent contractor are cases where
an occupier of land is sued for injuries inflicted upon a person or
thing on adjoining land.77 The civil law has evolved special rules
75. The problem is clearly stated by Oertmann in his note to Reichs-
gericht, Sept. 28, 1933, JW. (1933) 2513. There is a very large number of
French cases which turn around this question. Cour de Paris, May 19, 1848,
Sirey 1848.2.299; Ch. req., April 9, 1873, Sirey 1873.1.464; Ch. civ., July 28, 1886,
Sirey 1890.1.526; Ch. req., July 30, 1895, Sirey 1896.1.288; Feb. 1, 1897, Sirey
1898.1.323; Ch. civ., Dec. 21, 1898, Sirey 1902.1.67; Ch. req., Oct. 21, 1901, Dalloz
1902.1.457; Oct. 23, 1905, Sirey 1907.1.188; Aug. 7, 1906, Sirey 1907.1.88; Ch.
crim., March 3, 1923, Sirey 1923.1.400; Ch. civ., Dec. 15, 1926, Sirey 1927.1.51.
The English courts are inclined to deny the principal's liability: Marsh
v. Joseph [1897] 1 Ch. 213; Whitechurch v. Cavanagh [1902] A.C. 117; Ruben
v. Great Fingall Consolidated [1906] A.C. 439; Kreditbank Cassel G.M.B.H. v.
Schenkers, Ltd. [1927] 1 K.B. 826.
Not so the American courts: Fifth Ave. Bank of N.Y. v. Forty-Second
St. and Grand St. Ferry R.R., 137 N.Y. 231, 33 N.E. 378 (1893); Citizen's State
Bank v. Security Bank of Tyndall, 54 S.D. 233, 222 N.W. 932 (1929).
As to the relations with the ultra vires theory, see The British Mutual
Banking Co. v. The Charnwood Forest Ry., L.R. 18 Q.B.D. 714 (1887); Good-
hart, Corporate Liability and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires (1926) 2 Camb.
L. J. 350; Warren, Torts by Corporations in Ultra Vires Undertakings (1925)
2 Camb. L. J. 180 et seq. The Reichsgericht decided the problem in Dec. 22,
1931, RGZ. 134, 375.
76. That is the opinion of Seavey, op. cit. supra note 14, at 456 and
Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) 646.
77. The arguments used by the courts vary. See Hudgins v. Hann, 240
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for this type of situation-the rules of neighborly relations."
Broadly stated, there is imposed upon the owner of land a num-
ber of special duties toward his neighbors. He is not allowed to
send over smoke to annoy them, nor can he endanger their lives
or property through his excavations or constructions. At civil law
these duties are treated differently from other duties. The differ-
ences, however, are of no interest here with one exception: When
an adjoining landowner is sued for disturbances, injunctive relief
is appropriate in German law, and he cannot escape liability by
claiming that an independent contractor caused the harm. It
should be added that some cases involving the civil law concep-
tion of "neighborly duties" would be decided at common law
under the doctrine of private nuisance, where again according to
common opinion liability for the acts of the independent contrac-
tor exists. The positive law here only confirms what common
sense suggests. One cannot make such use of his land as will work
an unreasonable injury upon his neighbor. The demands thus
imposed upon him by the law are not met if he simply places the
dangerous or obnoxious task in the hands of an independent con-
tractor. We have seen that the special nature of a contractual
relationship imposes new responsibility for the conduct of em-
ployed persons. Similarly, the special nature of the neighbor re-
lationship results in the imposition of special duties.
The neighbor is not the only person to whom the landowner
79
owes special duties. Invitees, licensees, and even trespassers are
entitled to certain precautionary measures that cannot be dele-
gated to a third person. Here again it is interesting to notice not
only that similar results have been reached under different legal
Fed. 387 (C.C.A. 5th, 1917); Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 199 Ark. 846,
136 S.W. (2d) 484 (1940); Bonaparte v. Wiseman, 89 Md. 12, 42 At. 918 (1899);
Hanrahan v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 114 Md. 517, 80 Atl. 312
(1911); Pye v. Faxon, 156 Mass. 471, 31 N.E. 640 (1892); Cork v. Blossom, 162
Mass. 330, 38 N.E. 495 (1894); Cabot v. Kingman, 166 Mass. 403, 44 N.E. 344
(1896); Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N.E. 746 (1902); Pannella v.
Reilly, 304 Mass. 172, 23 N.E. (2d) 87 (1939); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge
Co. v. Steinbrock, 61 Ohio St. 215, 55 N.E. 618 (1899); Bower v. Peate, L.R.
1 Q.B. 321 (1876); Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740 (1881); Hughes v. Percival,
8 App. Cas. 443 (1883), which restricts-I think unfortunately-the sound
principle of Dalton v. Angus, supra.
78. In France developed by courts and legal authors: Colin et Capitant,
Cours Elementaire de Droit Civil (7 ed. 1931) 767; 3 Planiol-Ripert-Picard,
Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1926) 436, no 460 et seq. Liability
for disturbances caused by a lessee has been denied in Ch. req., June 12, 1855,
Sirey 1855.1.710; Jan. 19, 1898, Sirey 1898.1.264.
79. As to occupier of ships, see Marney v. Scott [1899] 1 Q.B. 986; Hillen
and Pettigrew v. I.C.I. Ltd. [1936] A.C. 65, affirming Hihlen v. I.C.I. [1934) 1
K.B. 455 on different grounds.
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systems, but that similar reasoning has been employed. The com-
mon law principles0 find their counterpart in the rule developed
by the German Supreme Court that the opening of premises to
the public (Verkehrserbffnung) imposes the obligation to keep
them in a safe condition.8 1 There are differences between the
licensees and invitees but both have the principle: The fact that
the harm was inflicted by an independent contractor is not suffi-
cient to excuse the occupier. 2 Under German law the occupier is
liable unless he himself took every step which might reasonably
be required to prevent the harm. A duty of personal supervision
is imposed upon him if he entrusted the care for the safety of the
premises to other persons. If this duty has been violated, he con-
sequently is responsible for his own fault. The torts of the inde-
pendent contractor are not ipso facto imputed to him. The situa-
tion with respect to the common law jurisdictions is not entirely
clear. Some of the decisions suggest principles similar to those
adopted in Germany; 3 others seem to assume that the master is
absolutely liable for the faults of the contractor. This latter solu-
tion probably harmonizes better with the notion that the master
is absolutely liable for the torts of the servant. It also avoids the
difficulties of the negligence test which we have already observed.
The similarity which the above type of situation bears to the
cases involving contractual relations is obvious. Although there
is no contract, express or implied,84 between the invitor and the
invitee or the public, there is at least conduct giving rise to cer-
tain expectations upon which others are entitled to rely. This
similarity of the situation justifies the similarity in legal treat-
ment. Neither the promisor nor the invitor can escape liability by
delegating his duties to a third person. In both cases the com-
plaint is organized in the same way-starting with an allegation
of a breach of duty rather than a tort of an employee. This leaves
80. Roby v. Keller, 114 F. (2d) 790 (C.C.A. 4th, 1940); Curtis v. Kiley, 153
Mass. 123, 26 N.E. 421 (1891); Sciolaro v. Asch, 198 N.Y. 77, 91 N.E. 263 (1910);
Richmond and M. R.R. v. Mooer, 94 Va. 493, 27 S.E. 70 (1897); Indermauer
v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866); Norman v. Great Western Railway [1915]
1 K.B. 584; Fairman v. Perpetual Investment Building Society [1923] A.C. 74.
81. E.g., Reichsgericht, Jan. 6, 1939, Deutsches Recht (1939) 374.
82. Reichsgericht, Sept. 16, 1919, Warn. (1919) 265.
83. For example, F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Carriker, 107 F. (2d) 689 (C.C.A.
8th, 1939) stating that the occupier is liable only if he had actual or con-
structive notice of the dangerous situation. The same argument is made use
of in Innumerable German decisions.
84. In Indermauer v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274, 287 (1866) the distinction be-
tween invitation and contract Is clearly drawn. Cf. Pollock, op. cit. supra
note 37, at 534.
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to the defendant the task of exculpating himself from liability, if
he can.
Another typical situation where the intervention of an inde-
pendent contractor is not a defense of the landowner arises when
a passerby is injured by an object falling from a building. 5 The
Romans created the rules of the cautio damni infecti and of the
actio de effusis et de ejectis. Developing these the civil law coun-
tries manifested a tendency to impose stricter liability in the
above type of situation than would follow from the application
of general tort principles. The degrees of responsibility have
varied and still vary.86 Although the German Civil Code8 7 does
not go so far as some common law jurisdictions, at least this
much becomes apparent: Here again is a special situation where
extraordinary care is required, and because of the fact that the
responsibility of the landowner is stricter than in other situations,
it includes acts of independent contractors also.
It is not difficult to understand why the law regards the situa-
tion we have described as a special one requiring stricter liability.
The falling of objects from a building adjoining a public way is
a thing of very frequent occurrence. This fact impels the courts
to seek a sure and efficacious remedy for the injured person. The
result can be best accomplished by imposing upon the owner of
the building a non-delegable responsibility. At the same time one
avoids the difficulty of having to discover who was the negligent
person. The occupier of the building is a person who may be eas-
ily ascertained and he himself must either assume the burden of
excusing himself or take recourse against the individual respon-
sible for the injury. The policy consideration which justifies this
stricter form of liability is very much similar to that which in
other situations led to the introduction of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine.
We have already observed that the danger to a passerby of
85. Deford v. Maryland, 30 Md. 179 (1868) (nuisance doctrine); Rait v.
New England Furniture & Carpet Co., 66 Minn. 76, 68 N.W. 729 (1896) (con-
trol doctrine); Privitt v. Jewett, 225 S.W. 127 (Mo. 1920) (based on the dan-
gerous enterprise doctrine); Smith v. Milwaukee Builders' & Traders' Ex-
change, 91 Wis. 360, 1041 (1895) (city ordinance); Cour d'appel d'Amiens, Feb.
24, 1869, Sirey 1869.2.67. But in many cases liability was denied. Chute v.
Mooser, 77 Kan. 706, 95 Pac. 398 (1903); Boomer v. Wilbur, 176 Mass. 482, 57
N.E. 1004 (1900); Davis v. John L. Whiting & Son Co., 201 Mass. 91, 87 N.E.
199 (1909); Douglas v. Holyoke Mach. Co., 233 Mass. 573, 124 N.E. 478 (1919);
Hexamer v. Webb, 101 N.Y. 377, 4 N.E. 755 (1886); Doerr v. Rand's Adm'r,
16 A. (2d) 377 (Pa. 1940); Noble v. Harrison [1926] 2 K.B. 332 (falling branch).
86. See, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof Wien, Nov. 3, 1914, G1UnF. 7098.
87. German Civil Code, §§ 836, 837, 838, 908.
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being 'struck by objects falling from buildings that adjoin the
public way is an ever-present peril. Consequently, liability for the
independent contractor in this case can be regarded as a special
aspect of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.8 Although
there is little agreement among courts and writers with respect
to the details of this doctrine, the fundamental principle is clear:
He who causes a dangerous enterprise to be undertaken or a dan-
gerous instrumentality to be used is responsible if an accident
happens in the undertaking or use1 9 In such case the fact that an
independent contractor was placed in charge is no excuse. The
rule can be deducted either from the absolute nature of the lia-
bility imposed or from the proposition that anyone who creates
such dangers even indirectly is himself obliged to take measures
of precaution. Modern economic life is built upon the use of dan-
gerous instrumentalities, but he who has the immediate advan-
tage of their use should be required to bear the cost of the
injuries inflicted thereby. It follows that any further development
of this theme should be directed toward defining the different
88. The following cases are typical situations which have been regarded
as dangerous enterprises: Excavations on a public road: City of Birmingham
v. McCrary, 84 Ala. 469, 4 So. 630 (1888); McCarrier v. Hollister, 15 S.D. 366,
89 N.W. 862 (1902). Contra: Kepperly v. Ramsden, 83 Ill. 354 (1876). Blasting:
Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Borough of Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495, 28 Atl. 32 (1893);
City of Joliet v. William Harwood, 86 Ill. 110 (1877); Wetherbee v. Partridge,
175 Mass. 185, 55 N.E. 894 (1900); Freebury v. Chicago N. & P.S. R.R., 77
Wash. 464, 137 Pac. 1044 (1914). Contra: Tibbets v. Knox & Lincoln R.R., 62
Me. 437 (1873); Blumb v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 112 (1884); Berg v. Parsons,
156 N.Y. Supp. 109, 50 N.E. 957 (1898). Window cleaning: Jacob Doll & Sons
v. Ribetti, 203 Fed. 593 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1913). But not painting of shutters: Davis
v. John L. Whiting & Son Co., 201 Mass. 91, 87 N.E. 199 (1909). Burning of
brush: Black v. Christchurch Finance Co. [1894] A.C. 48. Repair of an eleva-
tor without Interruption of service: Besner v. Central Trust Co. of New York,
230 N.Y. 357, 130 N.E. 577 (1921). Fumigating: Ferguson v. Ashkenazy, 29
N.E. (2d) 828 (Mass. App. 1940) (could be explained as a contract case). But
not the use of a highly volatile stuff which caused an explosion: Jennings
v. Vincent's Adm'x, 284 Ky. 614, 145 S.W. (2d) 537 (1940). United States v.
Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 258 Fed. 697 (D.C. Md. 1919) is probably an ordinary
negligence case. A motor car is not a dangerous instrumentality: Marion
Machine Foundry & Supply Co. v. Duncan, 101 P. (2d) 813 (Okla. 1940). Sur-
prisingly, fireworks are not always regarded as dangerous enterprises: Reis-
man v. Public Service Corp., 82 N.J. Law 464, 81 Atl. 838 (1911). Contra:
Sroka v. Halliday, 39 R.I. 119, 97 Atl. 965 (1916). The Reichsgericht too denied
the absolute liability of the employer of a firework firm April 26, 1913, RGZ.
82, 206, but in Oct. 8, 1914, J.W. (1915) 27, it assumed a non-delegable duty to
supervise the firework.
Other cases are collected In Note (1921) 23 A.L.R. 1084, 1102 et seq. Cf.
Kimber v. Gas Light and Coke Co. [1918] 1 K.B. 439; Brooke v. Bool [1928]
2 K.B. 458; Reichsgericht, April 11, 1935, RGZ. 147, 353 (high tension network
not imposing absolute liability).
89. It ought to be sufficient that the use of the dangerous instrumentality
was foreseeable: Cuff v. Newark & N.Y. R.R., 35 N.J. Law 17 (1870) (based
on nuisance doctrine). But compare Winnlford v. MacLeod, 68 Ore. 301, 136
Pac. 25 (1913).
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types of dangerous instrumentalities whose use imposes greater
responsibility. A tendency to expand this class of instrumentali-
ties is clearly observable. The countries of central Europe have
gone particularly far. They have introduced a type of liability
more or less absolute upon the use of railroads, motor cars, and
aircraft. It is noteworthy that even farther extensions have been
advocated by some writers.9 0
The statement that in a given instance the duty to take meas-
ures of precaution is not delegable 1 adds little to understanding
of the law. It is only another and more cumbersome way of stat-
ing that the employer is liable for the acts of the independent
contractor. For it is impossible to deduct from the content of the
duty alone that it is a non-delegable one. Although there are some
statutes and city ordinances which expressly allow or forbid one
person to shift to another the performance of a given obligation,
more often the prohibition against delegation is discovered
through a process of judicial interpretation.9 2 In such cases it is
fair to assume that the courts were motivated by a judgment of
values, and the technical question of whether or not delegation is
permissible was answered in the way that led to the desired re-
sult. The problem, then, is to discover the factor that weighs most
heavily in the court's scheme of values. Is it the general idea that
everybody should be liable for the acts of employed persons-
even independent contractors-; or is it a more limited principle,
90. Ehrenzweig, System des Osterreichischen Allgemeinen Privatrechts
(Wien 1920) II, 1, 625. Contra: Oberster Gerichtshof Wien, Oct. 24, 1933
(Austria, 1934) 63 Juristische Bldtter 237.
91. See the cases collected in Note (1921) 23 A.L.R. 984.
92. The interpretation of statutes and ordinances in this respect is often
very free. See, e.g., Barris v. American Chicle Co., 33 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. N.Y.
1940); Wilson and Brother v. White, 71 Ga. 506 (1883); Spence v. Schultz, 103
Cal. 208, 37 Pac. 220 (1894); Smith v. Milwaukee Builders' and Traders' Ex-
change, 92 Wis. 171, 64 N.W. 1041 (1895). For other cases see Note (1921) 23
A.L.R. 984, 989; Reichsgericht, JW. (1902) Beilage No. 75; Jan. 23, 1905, JW.
(1905) 144; Jan. 11, 1930, JW. (1930) 3213. The case of April 13, 1908, Warn.
(1908) 363 shows that the interpretation may turn on the question of who is
the addressee of the ordinance.
Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. v. M'Mullan [1934] A.C. 1 is another example
of an almost arbitrary interpretation of a statutory provision as introducing
a non-delegable duty. The same spirit induced the House of Lords in Wil-
sons & Clyde Coal Co. v. English [1938] A.C. 57 to regard the duty to provide
a safe working system as a non-delegable one. The result could be much
easier justified by the assumption of contractual duties. The Czechoslovakian
Supreme Court qualified the duty to sand a sidewalk as a non-delegable one.
Feb. 2, 1932, Vazny 12318; Sept. 24, 1932, Vazny 11928; Feb. 22, 1921, Vazny
934. The same appears to be true of Supreme Court of Austria, Dec. 1, 1931
(Austria 1932), 61 Juristische Blitter 86. The older decisions appear contra.
Oberster Gerichtshof Wien Sept. 30, 1903, GlUnF. 2446; Nov. 14, 1911. GlUnF.
6211; June 9, 1914, GlUnF. 6958.
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that the nature of the particular situation requires the imposition
of stricter liability? This question, of course, can never be an-
swered with the same certainty as a mathematical problem. Com-
parative law, however, may again facilitate the choice between
the above two possibilities. If it should happen that several legal
systems make the duty of care a non-delegable one in similar
situations, the inference is warranted that the nature of the in-
terests involved required the exception.
The latter inference finds ample support in the cases. In prac-
tically every instance where a non-delegable duty was found, the
special interests involved justified the imposition of strict liabil-
ity. In this connection the duties created by contract, invitation,
and the use. of dangerous instrumentalities must be mentioned
again, for very often the result in these cases was supported by
the assumption that a non-delegable duty was involved. By far
the majority of the remaining cases dealing with non-delegable
duties were concerned with accidents on public highways.93 A
typical case is the improperly guarded or unlighted excavation.
Here again it is interesting to observe that in the same situation
the German courts similarly impose strict responsibility, on the
93. Burgess v. Gray, 1 C.B. 578, 135 Eng. Reprint 667 (1845); Ellis v. The
Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., 2 El. & B. 767, 118 Eng. Reprint 955 (1853);
Gray v. Pullen, 5 B. & S. 970, 122 Eng. Reprint 1091 (1864); Holliday v. Na-
tional Telephone Co. [1899] 2 Q.B. 392; City of Birmingham v. McCrary, 84
Ala. 469, 4 So. 630 (1888); Thomas v. Harrington, 72 N.H. 45, 54 Atl. 285
(1903) and most of the cases cited in note 88. Other cases are found in Note
(1916) 18 A.L.R. 801, 846. Woodman v. Metropolitan R.R., 149 Mass. 335, 340,
21 N.E. 482, 483 (1899) is interesting because Holmes' language suggests the
rule that the employer is liable in spite of his personal diligence. Sometimes
& distinction is made between a direct violation and collateral negligence.
Water Co. v. Ware, 83 U.S. 566, 21 L.Ed. 485 (1872); Penny v. The Wimbledon
Urban District Council [1899] 2 Q.B. 72.
It need not be added that there are many cases where the liability of the
employer was denied for one reason or another, e.g., because the contractor
was in exclusive possession of the work. Kepperly v. Ramsden, 83 Ill. 354
(1876).
Another typical situation is the cellar hole case: The occupier of a house
allows the cellar flap on the sidewalk to be open for the delivery of goods.
A passer-by falls into the hole. Is the owner liable although the seller is an
independent contractor? French v. Boston Coal Co., 195 Mass. 334, 81 N.E.
265 (1901); Ray v. Manhattan Light, Heat & Power Co., 92 Minn. 101, 99 N.W.
782 (1904); Pickard v. Smith, 10 C.B. (N.S.) 470 (1861); Daniel v. Rickett,
Cockerell Co. Ltd. and Raymond [1938] 2 K.B. 322. The seller is not liable if
the carrier is an independent contractor. Wilson v. Hodgson's Kingston
Brewery Co. [1915] 85 L.J. 270. As to the German viewpoint, see Reichs-
gericht, Sept. 16, 1932, JW. (1932) 3702. As to the French point of view, see
Cour de Paris, Jan. 30, 1864, Sirey 1864.2.3.
As to the obstruction of waterways, see Hole v. The Sittingbourne and
Sheerness Ry., 6 H. & N. 488, 158 Eng. Reprint 201 (1861); Brownlow v. The
Metropolitan Board of Works, 18 C.B. (N.S.) 768, 143 Eng. Reprint 303 (1863);
The Snark [1899] P. 74.
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assumption that he who must care for the safety of the public
highway is responsible for its use; this duty is one which cannot
be discharged merely by entrusting the work to an independent
contractor, however reliable.9 4 The German Supreme Court im-
poses liability only for personal negligence, 5 thus always precipi-
tating a complicated and hopeless debate on the issue of
negligence. Whether the common law imposes in these situations
absolute liability or requires only personal measures of precau-
tion is not clear. The language of the decisions suggests the latter,
but actual discussions of the negligence of the defendant seem to
be rare.
In another direction the decisions under the common law go
further than those of Germany.96 The common law courts are
inclined to hold not only the municipality upon whom the duty
to care for the highway is incumbent, but also everyone who
carries out construction work on a highway or who uses the high-
way in connection with work on his adjoining premises.
A common principle is easily discernable in spite of minor
differences in the approach of the two systems. The traffic on the
roads requires special protection. Somebody (usually the munici-
pality) must "guarantee" the safety of the highways. This means
of course an exceptionally high degree of responsibility. In addi-
tion to this primary liability, those persons who caused an un-
usual interference with the safety of traffic are held for accidents
which they indirectly caused. This liability is so broad that it
embraces responsibility for the acts of independent contractors.
Most if not all of the cases where liability for the acts of the
independent contractor has been assumed have been instances
involving special interests which justified a requirement of very
94. Reichsgericht, March 16, 1905, JW. (1905) 284; June 8, 1905, JW. (1905)
486; June 11, 1908, Warn. (1908) 503; Jan. 26, 1911, Warn. (1911) 193; June 22,
1912, Warn. (1912) 420; April 7, 1930, RGZ. 128, 149; March 14, 1937, JW.
(1939) 1638. The Reichsgericht too qualifies these duties as non-delegable. It
assumes that the municipality has to care for the safety of its highways-a
rule which has been applied in most of the American jurisdictions too for a
long time. A few examples, two very early ones and two very recent ones, are
enough: Omaha v. Jensen, 35 Neb. 68, 52 N.W. 833 (1892); Storrs v. Utica, 17
N.Y. 104 (1858); Brooks v. Birmingham, 239 Ala. 172, 194 So. 525 (1940); Bar-
soom v. City of Reedley, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 413, 101 P. (2d) 743 (1940). Cf.
Conseil d'Etat, May 23, 1930, Dalloz 1930.3.49. The same rule obtained in Aus-
tria, Oberster Gerichtshof Wien, June 24, 1930 (Austria, 1930) 48 Zentralblatt
fir die juristische Praxis 867; Nov. 14, 1933 (Austria, 1933) 52 id. 369.
95. See, e.g., Reichsgericht, Nov. 20, 1902, RGZ. 53; June 11, 1931, JW.
(1931) 3325; OLG. Celle, Oct. 21, 1933, JW. (1933) 2920.
96. And those of Austria, see Oberster Gerichtshof Wien, Feb. 24, 1914,
GlUnF 6817.
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high care, or even absolute liability. As a result of this stricter
responsibility the distinction between servant and independent
contractor becomes irrelevant. In the absence of any such special
interests, however, the distinction is probably one which should
be preserved.
VI. FAMILY MEMBERS AS SERVANTS
In seeking to designate those persons for whose torts the
employer is liable, we encounter considerable difficulty when we
come to members of the family. It is undoubted that a family
member, like any other person, can assume the duties of a ser-
vant and thus bring into play the usual rules with respect to the
master's liability.97 But is a father liable for the torts of a son, for
example, who is not acting in the course of the former's business?
According to the principles we have discussed he would not be.
Nevertheless some French and English decisions have held a per-
son liable for the torts of his relatives and friends.9 This result
is reached by applying the control theory and inferring from the
right to control a relationship analagous to that of master and
servant.99 This so-called right of control, however, is a fiction. It
is never exercised and often is simply nonexistent. It is believed
that behind these decisions there is a more deep-rooted and per-
vasive explanation. This becomes clearer with the discovery that
97. Reichsgericht, Dec. 12, 1918, Warn. (1919) 55 (son); Oct. 12, 1936, RGZ.
152, 222 (wife of a farmer); Cour de Paris, Dec. 6, 1917, Dalloz 1919.2.43 (wife
working in a bar); Ch. civ., Jan. 28, 1935, Sirey 1935.1.141 (son of a farmer).
In France it is generally denied that the wife as such is the servant of the
husband. Ch. req., July 8, 1872, Sirey 1872.1.259; Cour d'appel de Nancy, Nov.
8, 1902, Sirey 1902.2.240; Ch. crim., Dec. 15, 1911, Sirey 1914.1.54. Cf. Barber v.
Pigden [1937] 1 K.B. 664. The husband administering the wife's estate is
not her servant. Cour d'appel d'Agen, June 22, 1911, Dalloz 1912.2.228.
98. In civil law counties the liability for minor children is covered by
special provisions. Art. 1384, French Civil Code; German Civil Code, § 832.
Article 2318 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 seems to impose absolute
liability on the parents, but this interpretation is doubtful. See Note (1932)
7 Tulane L. Rev. 119.
99. Ch. crim., July 11, 1913, Dalloz 1918.1.62 (friend); Dec. 14, 1928, Dalloz
1929.1.37 (brother-in-law); Cour de Paris, March 14, 1930, Dalloz 1930.2.115
(son); Ch. req., May 1930, Dalloz 1930.1.137 (friend); Ch. civ., April 17, 1931,
Sirey 1931.1.252 (father as master of the driving son although not having a
driver's license himself); Ch. req., April 18, 1932, Dalloz 1932.2.282; Pratt v.
Patrick [1924] 1 K.B. 488 (friend); Parker v. Miller [1926] 42 T.L.R. 408 (the
absent friend as master). But if a car had been lent for a longer period the
owner was no longer regarded as master. Cour de Paris, July 25, 1931, Dalloz
1932.2.101; Ch. civ., March 17, 1937, Sirey 1937.1.212; Daniels v. Vaux [1938]
2 K.B. 203. In Le Sage v. Le Sage, 224 Wis. 57,271 N.W. 369 (1937), the brother
was regarded as agent of his sister. The decision in Fallon v. Swackhamer,
226 N.Y. 444, 123 N.E. 737 (1919) raises the question whether the brother-in-
law who is allowed to drive pursues aims of his own or of the lender. The
case itself shows the futility of the distinction.
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nearly all these cases deal with automobile accidents. 100 They
appear to exemplify again the general tendency to impose lia-
bility upon the owner of a dangerous instrumentality-the auto-
mobile. The result is achieved indirectly by means of extending
farther the notion of "servant."'1 1 If this explanation is sound,1 0 2
the decisions referred to above do not present a serious argument
against the distinction between servants and other persons.
VII. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND TORT
Under all legal systems the master is not liable for the torts
committed by a servant unless the latter's wrong bears a rela-
tionship of some sort to his employment. It would hardly be con-
tended, for example, that an employer should be held for injuries
inflicted in an affray which takes place over domestic difficulties
in the employee's own residence. The function of the concept
"within the scope of employment" is to separate such cases from
others where the employer is responsible. That this function must
be fulfilled, and through the means of a concept of some sort, is
beyond question. But the concept employed may be well adapted
to its purpose or not. The latter is the case if the concept when
applied to the factual situations which are brought before the
court gives rise to considerable doubt and uncertainty. If we are
to judge from the enormous amount of litigation arising out of
the question whether a servant's tort was committed "within the
scope of his employment," we are tempted to conclude that the
device adopted by the common law judges is not a happy one.
Doubts grow stronger as we observe that civil law jurisdictions
have been able to solve this same problem with much less litiga-
tion, although the task is the same, and similar notions are in use.
Under the French law the master is liable for the torts of the ser-
vant committed "in the functions for which he was employed,"'103
and under the German code he is responsible for harmful acts
100. See the cases cited in the preceding footnote.
101. Burdick, The Law of Torts (4 ed. 1926) 190. Another device used in
order to hold the owner in this type of case is the family car doctrine. In
Germany where a liability statute exists, the courts took another view. Kam-
mergericht, Sept. 29, 1933. JW. (1933) 112 (the son-in-law driving the car of
the mother-in-law is not her servant). Cf. Reichsgericht, March 12, 1934, JW.
(1934) 1642 (the son giving his father a ride is not his servant); Reichsger-
icht, Oct. 22, 1934, JW. (1935) 35 (he who rides with another paying part of
the expenses and directing the route is not a "master").
102. But see Katz v. Reissman Rotham Corp., 261 App. Div. 862, 24 N.Y.
S. (2d) 807 (1941) (workman's compensation case).
103. Art. 1384, French Civil Code. Article 2320 of the Louisiana Civil Code
uses the clause "in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed."
1941]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. IV
done "in the performance of the servant's work.'' °4 It is interest-
ing to speculate as to why the common law courts have encoun-
tered so much more difficulty in the application of the notion
"within the scope of employment" than have the German and
French courts in the application of their corresponding notions.
The only explanation the writer can offer is that different meth-
ods of interpretation have been adopted under the several sys-
tems. From the very beginning the French and German courts
have given their concepts a very broad meaning and left their
application to the lower courts which have to decide the questions
of fact. The German Supreme Court does not require more than
that there be a connection between the servant's tort and the
work incumbent upon him,10 5 while the French Supreme Court
has gone still further and stated that the master is liable even for
torts committed d l'occasion du travail.10 6 Under so broad a defi-
nition only a few situations, such as, for example, the "smoker
cases"'0 7 and some of the cases involving an agent's fraud, have
104. German Civil Code, § 831. Section 31 of the German Civil Code uses
similar language with respect to the torts of the constitutional representative
of a corporate body.
105. Reichsgericht, May 29, 1906, RGZ. 63, 341 (contract case); April 25,
1910, JW. (1910) 652; March 20, 1916, Warn. (1916) 199; March 14, 1937, JW.
(1939) 1638. Whether this connection exists has to be decided upon the facts
of the particular case, Reichsgericht, April 30, 1924, JW. (1924) 1714.
106. Ch. req., Jan. 30, 1935, Sirey 1935.1.144. For example, joke played by
one worker upon another: Ch. crim., Feb. 5, 1915, Dalloz 1919.1.8. Cf. the
contrary decision in Western Railway of Alabama v. Milligan, 239 Ala. 172,
33 So. 438 (1902). Railroad engineer committing a customs duty defraudation:
Cour d'appel de Lyon, July 1, 1872, Sirey 1873.2.42; Ch. crim., March 22, 1907,
Sirey 1907.1.473. Janitor accomplice to the seduction of a girl living in the
house: Cour de Paris, Oct. 8, 1856, Sirey 1857.2.446. The truck driver interrupts
his journey and shoots pheasants: Ch. crim., Nov. 23, 1928, Sirey 1931.1.153.
A chauffeur commits rape: Tribunal correctionel de Lille, March 15, 1930,
Sirey 1931.2.86. Causing a fire: Ch. req., Dec. 12, 1893, Sirey 1896.1.91; Cour
d'appel d'Aix, March 13, 1914, Sirey 1914.2.177. Valet blowing horn: Ch. crim.,
Aug. 30, 1860, Sirey 1860.1.1013. The driver of a bus company diverts custom-
ers from a hotel: July 29, 1856, Sirey 1857.2.298. Most of these decisions state
that it is a question of fact whether the servant acted within the scope of
his employment. See, in addition, Ch. crim., July 25, 1918, Sirey 1922.1.90.
Common opinion in Germany denies the master's liability for t6its committed
bei Gelegenheit of the employment. See Kress, Lehrbuch des allgemeinen
Schuldrechts (1929) 336. Contra: Oberster Gerichtshof, Wien Aug. 8, 1910,
GlUnF. 1529.
107. An employee smokes and causes a fire; liability of the master de-
nied: Lindley v. McKay, 146 S.W. (2d) 545 (Ark. 1941); Feeney v. Standard
Oil Co., 58 Cal. App. 587, 209 Pac. 85 (1922); Williams v. Jones, 3 H. & C. 602,
159 Eng. Reprint 668 (1865); Reichsgericht, Nov. 5, 1915, RGZ. 87, 276 (a
contract case, must be regarded as overruled; already the earlier deiision of
Feb. 20, 1914, RGZ. 84, 222 appears to be inconsistent with it). Liability
affirmed: Irving C. Palmer v. Keene Forestry Ass'n, 80 N.H. 43, 112 At. 798
(1921); Keyser Canning v. Klots Throwing Co., 94 W.Va. 346, 118 S.E. 521
(1923); Ch. crim., Dec. 13, 1856, Sirey 1857.1.442; Cour d'appel de Bordeaux,
June 28, 1920, Sirey 1921.2.27; Jefferson v. Derbyshire Farmers Ltd. [1921] 2
K.B. 281; Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, May 24, 1928, Vazny 8080.
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remained really doubtful.10 8 In contrast to this approach the com-
mon law courts have attempted to work out a variety of tests to
ascertain whether a tort was or was not committed "within the
scope of employment;" but the experience of more than a century
has proved all these tests unsatisfactory. The earlier ones were
gradually abandoned after it was discovered that they led to
unjust results when applied to later cases. The present state of
the common law is very near to that of the civil law,10 9 but the
old theories are still pressed into frequent service, sometimes
with unfair results.
It is not necessary, of course, that the master had author-
ized 10 the servant to do the particular act complained of."' Never-
108. Examples where French courts denied the connection between work
and tort: A maid servant uses a stamp which had already been used (Trib-
unal correctionel de Vannes, Jan. 7, 1931, Sirey 1932.2.96); a worker commits
indecent acts against a male apprentice (Tribunal civil de St. Etienne, Jan.
31, 1923, Dalloz 1923.2.158); a man servant shoots out of the window (Cour
d'appel de.Douai, Feb. 14, 1894, Dalloz 1895.2.381); a workman deposits a
bomb in another's yard, the bomb being made out of material stolen in the
factory (Ch. crim., Dec. 15, 1894, Sirey 1895.1.151); a railroad employee tries
out the truck of a customer in the railroad yard during working hours (Ch.
civ., May 24, 1927, Sirey 1927.1.309); row between workers (Cour d'appel de
Douai, Feb. 24, 1902 and Jan. 12, 1903, Sirey 1904.2.298); the housemaid gives
spoiled wine to a beggar (Ch. req., June 5, 1861, Sirey 1862.1.151); acts of
private vengeance (Cour d'appel de Paris, May 19, 1874, Sirey 1875.2.36). Cf.
Ch. req., Dec. 20, 1904, Sirey 1905.1.173; Oct. 29, 1917, Sirey 1918.1.199.
109. Cf. Smith, supra note 60, at 718.
110. This statement or the corresponding one that the master is liable
even if he has forbidden the tortious act is found in innumerable cases.
Seymour v. Greenwood, 6 H. & N. 359, 364, 158 Eng. Reprint 148, 151 (1861)
[but see Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 H. & N. 355, 358, 158 Eng. Reprint 511,
512 (1861)]; Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., 1 H. & C. 526, 541, 543,
158 Eng. Reprint 993, 999, 1000 (1862); Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank,
L.R. 2 Ex. 259, 266 (1867); Swire v. Francis, 3 App. Cas. 106, 113 (1877); Goh
Choon Seng v. Lee Kim Soo [1925] A.C. 550 (but see the important restric-
tions in the opinion of Lord Phillimore at 554); The Philadelphia and Reading
Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. 468, 487, 14 L.Ed. 502, 510 (1852); Orr v. William J. Burns
International Detective Agency, 337 Pa. 587, 12 A. (2d) 25 (1940); Smith v.
Yellow Cab Co., 173 Wis. 33, 180 N.W. 125 (1920).
Similar statements are made by the French courts. Ch. crim., June 11,
1836, Sirey 1837.1.452; Ch. civ., May 11, 1846, Sirey 1846.1.364; Ch. crim., Dec.
3, 1846, Sirey 1847.1.302.
But many cases require that the agent have some sort of authority.
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lamsden, 172 U.S. 534, 19 S.Ct. 296, 43 L.Ed.
543 (1898); Dolan v. Hubinger, 109 Iowa 408, 80 N.W. 514 (1899); Strader's
Adm'rs v. President and Directors of Lexington Hydraulic & Mfg. Co., 146
Ky. 580, 142 S.W. 1073 (1912); Craig's Adm'x v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 183
Ky. 274, 209 S.W. 33 (1919); Tarver v. J. W. Sanders Cotton Mill, 187 Miss.
111, 192 So. 17 (1939); Muller v. Hillenbrand, 227 N.Y. 448, 125 N.E. 808 (1920);
Marlowe v. Bland, 154 N.C. 140, 69 S.E. 752 (1910); Edwards v. The London
& North Western Ry, L.R. 5 C.P. 445 (1870); Lord Bolingbroke v. The Local
Board of Swindon New Town, L.R. 9 C.P. 575 (1874); Bank of New South
Wales v. Owston, L.R. 4 App. Cas. 270 (1879); Beard v. London General Omni-
bus Co. [1900] 2 Q.B. 530; Hanson v. Waller [19011 1 Q.B. 390; The Cor-
poration of Glasgow v. Lorimer [19111 A.C. 209; Radley v. London County
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theless some courts still require that the act be a part of the
duties assigned to the servant. 11 2 Thus, if a railroad employee has
ejected a passenger with unnecessary force, there may arise the
question of whether this employee was charged with the admis-
Council [1913] 109 L.T.R. 162. In cases of arrest by a railroad employee the
American courts are less inclined than the English to inquire into the au-
thority of the agent or railroad. Krulevitz v. Eastern R.R., 140 Mass. 573, 5
N.E. 500 (1886); Kelley v. Durham Traction Co., 132 N.C. 368, 43 S.E. 923
(1903). The English doctrine [Poulton v. The London & S.W. Ry., L.R. 2 Q.B.
534 (1867); Ormiston v. Great Western Ry. [1917] 1 K.B. 5983. A rule that
the master cannot authorize an arrest which he himself cannot lawfully
make has been adopted in New York [Mali v. Lord, 39 N.Y. 381 (1868);
Homeyer v. Yaverbaum, 197 App. Div. 184, 188 N.Y. Supp. 849 (1927)].
In some cases the master's liability for a servant's assault or illegal
imprisonment was denied because the servant had no authority to punish
a past aggression as opposed to authority to protect the master's goods
against actual attack. Brown v. Boston Ice Co., 178 Mass. 108, 59 N.E. 644
(1901); Girvin v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., 166 N.Y. 289, 59 N.E. 921 (1901);
Dqniel v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 136 N.C. 517, 48 S.E. 816 (1904); Allen v.
The London and S.W. Ry., L.R. 6 Q.B. 65 (1870); Abrahams v. Deakin [1891]
1 Q.B. 516.
It is, of course, possible to find reasons for distinguishing the two groups
of cases, e.g., the particular nature of the tort committed by the servant
(unlawful arrest, slander).
111. If the chauffeur or railroad employee violating his instructions gives
a hiker a ride and causes an accident, justice seems to require that the
master should not be held; the result can be reached in different ways. It
has been contended, for example, that the chauffeur acted outside his em-
ployment [Houston C.A. & N. Ry. v. Bolling, 59 Ark. 395, 27 S.W. 492 (1894);
Keating v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 97 Mich. 154, 56 N.W. 346 (1893); Schulwitz
v. Delta Lumber Co., 126 Mich. 559, 85 N.W. 1075 (1901)]. This, however, is
less convincing than the approach adopted by the French courts which have
held that the hiker does not have a claim if he knew that the chauffeur
violated his duties [Ch. crim., Dec. 12, 1903, Dalloz 1904.1.70; June 22, 1933,
Dalloz 1933.1.5; Cour d'appel de Dijon, June 6, 1933, Sirey 1933.2.213] but he
has a claim if he did not know it [Ch. req., April 3, 1933, Sirey 1933.1.190].
In Germany the situation is discussed under the head of Geffilligkeitsfahrt;
in many American jurisdictions "guest statutes" cover the case.
112. For that reason the master's liability for a traffic accident was de-
nied if not the chauffeur but another employee was driving. Seaboyer v.
Davis, 244 Mass. 122, 138 N.E. 538 (1923); Esposito v. American Ry., 194 App.
Div. 347, 185 N.Y. Supp. 353 (1920). Contra: Engelhard v. Farrant & Co. and
T. J. Lipton [1897] 1 Q.B. 240; Beard v. London General Omnibus Co. [1900]
2 Q.B. 530. In Crippin v. Sunshine Transp. Co., 260 App. Div. 52, 20 N.Y.S. (2d)
750 (1940) the master's liability was denied because, against instructions, the
driver allowed a third person to drive.
The Reichsgericht too applied this argument when it denied the liability
of a railroad sued for the loss of goods stolen by a switchman, on the ground
that he was not in charge of handling the goods. Reichsgericht, June 16,
1926, S.A. 80, 319. Cf. March 2, 1922, RGZ. 104, 141 (fraud of an agent). Better:
Reichsarbeitsgericht, March 21, 1936, JW. (1936) 2424; Ch. Crim., Nov. 24,1899,
Sirey 1902.1.296.
Someone hires a coach and driver; the driver steals the bailee's goods
carried in the coach. Reichsgericht, Dec. 4, 1919, JW. (1920) 284 and Cheshire
v. Bailey [1905] 1 K.B. 237 both deny the liability of the master (bailor).
The result is puzzling. The master is not responsible if the driver stole the
goods, but he is responsible if another stole them as a result of the driver's
neglect. Abraham v. Bullock, 86 L.T.R. 796 (1902).
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sion of passengers;118 or if a department store employee has
caused the arrest of a customer suspected of theft, it may be
asked whether he was a private detective, charged with the duty
of watching the public, or an ordinary salesman. 1 4 There is little
doubt that such distinctions are universally regarded as unreason-
able. It should be sufficient that the ejection or the arrest were
connected with the work entrusted to the servant, and is clear
that such a connection existed in the above cases.
It appears further that the distinction cannot be drawn en-
tirely along lines of the oservant's intent. The principal is liable
for the frauds of the agent despite the fact that the latter may
have wished to reap the fruits of his wrong.115 In such cases it is
sufficient that the agent purports to act for the principal and that
his employment afforded him the opportunity for his fraud.", On
the other hand, the servant's motive may well exclude liability
by the master in a case such as has already been suggested where
death or injury resulted from a domestic difficulty.1 17 It seems to
follow that the motive of the servant may be the determining
factor if the act resulting in injury is not by its nature connected
with the work entrusted to the servant. But if an objective con-
nection between the tort and the nature of the work entrusted
exists the motive of the servant can hardly be relevant; e. g., if a
higher employee reproaches a lower one of having stolen goods
of the common employer, the employer should be held even if the
higher employee had a personal grudge against the lower one.118
113. Farber v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 116 Mo. 81, 22 S.W. 631 (1893); Haehl
v. Wabash Ry., 119 Mo. 325, 24 S.W. 737 (1893) (it was asked whether the
watchman had the duty of keeping trespassers from the railroad bridge).
The better view was taken in Dorsey v. Kansas City P. & G. Ry., 104 La.
478, 29 So. 177 .(1901); Cook v. Southern Ry., 128 N.C. 333, 38 S.E. 925 (1901).
114. The better view was taken in Staples v. Schmid, 18 R.I. 224, 26 Atl.
193 (1893).
115. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Railway, 278 U.S. 349, 49 S.Ct. 161, 73
L.Ed. 415 (1929).
116. Apparent authority is sufficient. Slingsby v. Westminster Bank [1932]
1 K.B. 544, 560, affirming Slingsby v. Westminster Bank [1931] 2 K.B. 266, 109
L.J. 757. A further condition is that the victim had the intention to deal with
the agent as agent and not personally. Lloyd v. Grace Smith & Co. [1912]
A.C. 716; Ch. civ., June 16, 1884, Dalloz 1885.1.213; Cour d'appel d'Angers, Jan.
15, 1890, Dalloz 1890.2.111; Ch. req., Oct. 30, 1911, Sirey 1912.1.131; Dec. 4, 1912,
Sirey 1913.1.132; Cour d'appel de Paris, Jan. 12, 1926, Dalloz 1926.2.59; Ch. req.,
March 28, 1933, Sirey 1933.1.247.
117. An illuminating case is Nelson Business College Co. v. Lloyd, 60 Ohio
St. 448, 54 N.E. 471 (1899).
118. In slander cases the courts have been reluctant to qualify the slander
as committed within the scope of employment. See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Bridwell, 103 Ark. 345, 147 S.W. 64 (1912); Keller v. Safeway Stores, 111 Mont.
28, 108 P. (2d) 605 (1940); Hypes v. Southern Ry., 82 S.C. 315, 64 S.E. 395
(1909) on the one side and Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lamsden, 172 U.S.
1941]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. IV
More important, however, than the question how far the motive
of the servant has to be taken into account is the question how
far juries are willing to believe the allegedly personal motives.
Common sense cannot believe that the cashier causing the arrest
of a person whom he suspected of having passed him false money
to be put into the employer's cash register wanted to vindicate
the public interest,11 9 or that the watchman on duty shot an in-
truder because he wanted to find out for himself who was on the
premises.120
534, 19 S.Ct. 296, 43 L.Ed. 543 (1898); Vowles v. Yakish, 191 Iowa 368, 179
N.W. 117 (1920); Courtney v. American Ry. Express Co., 120 S.C. 511, 113 S.E.
332 (1922) on the other. For other cases, see Notes (1920) 13 A.L.R. 1142,
(1922) 24 id. 133, 137, (1921) 70 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 138. In some jurisdictions
there is a special rule restricting the responsibility of corporations for the
slanders of their employees. As to partnerships, see Markely v. Snow, 207 Pa.
447, 56 Atl. 999 (1904). Cf. Cour d'appel de Paris, June 16, 1896, Sirey 1896.2.208.
(In the presence of a prospective lessee a janitor slanders the owner of
another house who also has apartments for rent.) There are other examples
in which it is difficult to understand why the court denied that the tort was
committed within the employment and where a court of the continent would
probably not have hesitated to hold the employer: McDermott v. American
Brewing Co., 105 La. 124, 29 So. 498 (1901) (assault in order to enforce pay-
ment); Valley v. Clay, 151 La. 710, 92 So. 308 (1922) (assault of a chauffeur
whom another automobilist had reproached); Everingham v. Chicago B. &
Q. R.R., 148 Iowa 662, 127 N.W. 1009 (1910) (assault of a switchman on the
occasion of an argument over the use of the track); Crelly v. Missouri &
Kansas Telephone Co., 84 Kan. 19, 113 Pac. 386 (1911) (the manager forces
an employee to sign a voucher); Holler v. P. Sanford Ross, 68 N.J. Law 324,
53 AtI. 472 (1902) (watchman shooting while on duty); Joseph Rand, Ltd. v.
Craig [1919) Ch. 1 (carters depositing rubbish). But see Cornford v. Carlton
Bank [1899] 1 Q.B. 392.
Assaults committed by employees during a dispute over goods or prices,
et cetera, are usually rightly held to be within the scope of employment.
Dlii v. Johnson, 107 F. (2d) 669 (App. D.C. 1939); J. M. High Co. v. Holler,
42 Ga. App. 653, 157 S.E. 209 (1931); Schwartz v. Nunnally Co., 60 Ga. App.
858, 5 S.E. (2d) 91 (1939); Central Motor Co. v. Gallo, 94 S.W. (2d) 821 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1936). Contra: National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ringo, 137 S.W.
(2d) 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). For a case of illegal intrusion upon premises,
see Axman v. Washington Gas Light Co., 28 App. D.C. 150 (1912).
If an employee plays a trick or joke upon a third person, the employer
seems to be liable if it was done with a dangerous instrumentality entrusted
for the purpose of the employment. Texas & P. Ry. v. Scoville, 62 Fed. 730
(C.C.A. 5th, 1894); Alseyer v. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R., 115 Iowa 338, 88
N.W. 841 (1902); Berry v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 536, 74 N.E. 933
(1905); Cobb v. Columbia & G. R.R., 37 S.C. 194, 15 S.E. 878 (1892). But see
Stephenson v. Southern Pac. Co., 93 Cal. 558, 29 Pac. 234 (1892). See especially
the "torpedo cases," Pittsburgh C. & St. L. Ry. v. Shields, 47 Ohio St. 387, 24
N.E. 658 (1890); Euting v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 116 Wis. 13, 92 N.W. 358
(1902). Contra: Sullivan v. Louisville & N. R.R., 115 Ky. 447, 74 S.W. 171
(1903).
119. This was the question in Mulligan v. New York & R. B. Ry., 129 N.Y.
506, 29 N.E. 952 (1892). Cf. Lafltte v. New Orleans and Lake R.R., 43 La. Ann.
34, 8 So. 701 (1891) (contract case); Palmeri v. Manhattan Ry., 133 N.Y. 261,
30 N.E. 1001 (1892); Daniel v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 136 N.C. 517, 48 S.E.
816 (1904).
120. This Is what the watchman, as witness, told the jury in Holler v.
P. Sanford Ross, 68 N.J. Law 324, 53 Atl. 472 (1902).
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It is not difficult to understand why the effort to establish
criteria distinguishing acts within the scope of employment from
those outside it has been unsuccessful. The different criteria pro-
posed did not refer to easily distinguishable facts, but to notions
which are quite as fluid as the notion of scope of employment
itself, furtherance of the master's business, compact of duties, et
cetera. One uncertain notion has been supplanted by other no-
tions of equal uncertainty. However the notion may be defined,
the decision is based upon value judgments which it seems impos-
sible to make more specific, but which, at the same time, appear
to have a solid base in common sense. Consequently it is very
reasonable to let the jury decide this question upon the peculiar-
ity of the factual situation.121 In France and Germany with their
different court systems the same consideration leads to a different
but nevertheless analogous rule: The Supreme Court will gen-
erally not interfere with the decision of the lower court insofar
as it affirms or denies the connection between tort and employ-
ment.
Upon looking back on the typical situations which have been
adjudicated, we are left with the impression that the application
of the phrase "within the scope of employment" would not have
met with unusual difficulties had it not been elaborated upon.
Most of the trouble can be attributed to the courts' insistence
upon making further definitions. Had they simply required some
sort of connection between the injurious act and the servant's
duties, the problem might have been relatively simple.12 2 One
typical situation, however, presents an obstacle in the way of this
easy solution-the well known cases of frolic and detour of chauf-
feurs and truck drivers.12 On few other questions has so much
effort been expended with such unsatisfactory results. Even con-
ceding that the tests used in this type of case lead to certain
and predictable results, we are left with the impression that their
121. The assertion of A.L.I., Restatement of the Law of Agency (1933)
§ 228 that it is a question of fact is open to question. Contra: Baty, Vicarious
Liability (1916) 135. The correct approach has been given by Bohlen, Studies
in the Law of Torts (1926) 601.
122. Contra: Note (1940) 19 Ore. L. Rev. 184. The problem of defining
"injuries arising out of and in the course of employment" which must be
solved in workmen's compensation cases is a similar but not identical one
because a workman has probably to be insured against more dangers than
a third person. An analogy has been drawn in Knight Iron & Metal Co. v.
Ardis, 240 Ala. 305, 199 So. 717 (1940).
123. Leading case: 'Joel v. Morison, 6 Car. & P. 501, 172 Eng. Reprint
1338 (1834). The large number of cases have so often been discussed that it
is not necessary to mention them again. See Note (1939) 122 A.L.R. 863.
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use has given rise to distinctions which cannot meet the approval
of our sense of justice.12 One wonders, for example, if it should
matter a great deal whether an accident attributable to the care-
lessness of a "frolicking" chauffeur happened to take place ten
feet before the car returned to its proper route, or later, on the
way from or to the working place, in the allotted area of work
or not, et cetera. The simple test requiring merely some sort of
connection between the accident and the employment seems also
to encounter difficulties in some of these situations as where the
servant has stolen the car.125 The ordinary rules of respondeat
superior, however defined, do not lead to satisfactory results in
this type of case. The reason is again that special interests in-
volved require special regulation. The general use of automo-
biles requires the imposition of special rules of liability upon
their owners. When proper rules in this respect have been
adopted, the problem of whether or not the chauffeur causing the
accident was on a frolic or a detour will disappear; the owner of
the automobile will be liable in either case.12" The trend of the
law is in this direction. In some states there has been created
either by statute12 7 or judicial legislation 1 2 a presumption that
the chauffeur acted within the scope of his employment; other
statutory rules have a similar effect in practice. 2 9 The civil law
jurisdictions have rules imposing liability upon the owner or
other person in possession of a motor car, regardless of his own
negligence. Under a system of absolute liability of the motor car
124. See, e.g., Holdsworth v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 337 Pa.
235, 10 A. (2d) 412 (1940).
125. The German Supreme Court holds that an accident caused during
a frolic (Schwarzfahrt) is not committed within the scope of the employ-
ment. Reichsgericht, Nov. 10, 1927, RGZ. 119, 58; April 4, 1932, RGZ. 36, 15.
The problem has little practical importance as the case is covered by the
liability statute. The French Supreme Court, Ch. crim., Dec. 12, 1903, Dalloz
1904.1.70; March 23, 1907, Dalloz 1908.1.351; Ch. req., Nov. 17, 1919, Dalloz
1920.1.156, The Austrian Supreme Court, Nov. 11, 1903, GlUnF. 2486, and the
Czechoslovakian Supreme Court, Feb. 11, 1928, Vazny 7780 take the opposite
view. But see Ch. req., Feb. 26, 1918, Sirey 1918.1.119.
126. Ch. civ., Dec. 18, 1933, Sirey 1934.1.107.
127. Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1935) § 1661c.
128. See, for example, Standard Coffee Co. v. Trippet, 108 F. (2d) 161
(C.C.A. 5th, 1939); Barmore v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 85 Miss. 426, 38 So.
210 (1905) (railroad tricycle); Gordon v. Bleeck Automobile Co., 233 S.W.
265 (Mo. 1921); Ursch v. Heier, 201 Mo. App. 129, 241 S.W. 439 (1922); Broad-
dus v. Long, 135 Tex. 353, 138 S.W. (2d) 1057 (1940). Contra: Hartnett v.
Gryzmish, 218 Mass. 258, 105 N.E. 988 (1914). A still broader presumption has
been adopted in California: Robinson v. George, 100 Cal. Dec. 293, 105 P. (2d)
914 (1940).
129. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 1627, Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1935) § 1658c;
D.C. Code (Supp. 1939) tit. 6, § 2556; New York Vehicle and Traffic Law §
559; Psota v. Long Island R.R., 246 N.Y. 388, 159 N.E. 180 (1927).
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owners,130 the owner is responsible if the accident happened
while the car was entrusted to another person and then, of
course, it, will make no difference whether the driver was or was
not acting within the scope of his employment.
It is true that the development of special rules on the liability
of motor car owners will generate new problems of application. 13 1
Who, for example, should be held primarily liable-the owner,
the lessee, the thief? A group of new questions is certain to arise
with the erection of a novel principle. But an immense advantage
would be gained if the problems arising from the use of automo-
biles could be dealt with upon a direct evaluation of the particu-
lar interests and dangers involved in their use. If a forthright
solution were available, it would no longer be necessary to apply
the rules of respondeat superior to situations which were not
foreseen when the doctrine was formulated and to which they
cannot be applied except by means of a tenuous manipulation.
130. A compilation is to be found in Institut International de Rome pour
l'Uniflcation du Droit Privd, Responsabilit6 Civile des A:utomobilistes (1935).
131. See Note (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 171, 173 (liability for bailee) as to
the problem of constitutionality. See Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371,
140 N.W. 615 (1913). For an analysis of the problem, see Columbia University
Council for Research in the Social Sciences, Report by the Committee to
Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, Philadelphia (1932) 132 et seq.
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